Operational Intelligence with GDPR by Lourenço, André Sequeira Borges
   
 
 
2018 
UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA 
FACULDADE DE CIÊNCIAS 
DEPARTAMENTO DE INFORMÁTICA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operational Intelligence With GDPR 
 
 
 
 
André Sequeira Borges Lourenço 
 
 
 
Mestrado em Segurança Informática 
 
 
 
Trabalho de Projeto orientado por: 
Prof. Maria Dulce Pedroso Domingos 
Nuno Alexandre Matias Gomes Dias 
 
 
   
 
2 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
More and more we live in a world that’s powered by data. All kinds of applications, from social 
networks to business products, produce data just by existing and performing the actions that they’re 
intended to. Take for example a telco company where thousands of both residential and business 
customer orders arrive each day, it is expected that at the very moment we buy a product we’re giving 
away info about what we’re buying and, more important, about who we are. It is of the company’s 
interest that all data is kept in an interpretable format in order to infer what products interest their 
customers and analyse the company’s operations to maintain their service as available and efficient as 
possible. These systems are normally decentralized by nature, meaning that it is not uncommon to have 
separate sub-systems with well-defined purposes, like Customer Relationship Management (CRM) 
systems that handle customer orders, backend systems that perform the actions and Enterprise Service 
Buses (ESB) that serve as the middleware between CRMs and backend systems. This is why most 
companies are nowadays keen to use Operational Intelligence (OI) as a tool to gather all data into an 
understandable format. 
Nevertheless, this opens a new problem with the arrival of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR). Companies are now facing a trade-off that can compromise the processing of 
personal data. Protecting data with standard encryption methods like the Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) leaves that same data in a non-processable format while not protecting it at all is risking the huge 
penalties that GDPR enforces. This not only forces these companies to abort the business of personal 
data processing and, with it, some of its most interested clients, as it also blocks any new solutions that 
were being prepared in the meantime. 
This thesis studies a real-world scenario of a OI application whose intention is to process 
personal data in the future. This scenario fits in the description of the application whose new 
functionalities are currently on hold due to GDPR. It also uses a well-known OI platform named Splunk, 
which also suffers of the same trade-off problem. 
 The contribution of this thesis is to evaluate whether it is possible to protect data according to 
GDPR’s requirements and still leave it in a format that is processable in the Splunk platform. For this, 
different homomorphic encryption algorithms will be tested and compared with the standard symmetric 
encryption algorithms on different big data scenarios.  
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Resumo 
 Cada vez mais vivemos num mundo que se move com o poder dos dados. Todo o tipo de 
aplicações, desde redes sociais a produtos negócio, produzem dados apenas por existir e realizar as ações 
que se esperam delas. Tome-se como exemplo uma empresa de telecomunicações onde são esperados 
milhares de clientes novos, quer residenciais quer de negócio. É esperado que, a partir do momento em 
que compramos algo nós estejamos também a fornecer informação sobre o que estamos a comprar e, 
acima de tudo, informação sobre o que somos. É do interesse das empresas que este tipo de informação 
seja mantida num formato que seja fácil de interpretar, de modo a inferir quais são os produtos que os 
clientes querem comprar e analisar o modo como essas compras são efetuadas para assegurar uma 
melhor manutenção do serviço. Estes sistemas são normalmente descentralizados o que significa que 
não é pouco comum a existência de sistemas secundários com propósitos bem definidos, como sistemas 
de gestão de relações com o cliente (CRM), sistemas de backend que realizam as operações que 
constituem o serviço e os chamados Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) que servem de middleware entre os 
CRMs e os sistemas de backend. É devido a esta complexidade de operações que as empresas dão cada 
vez mais valor ao uso de Inteligência Operacional como uma ferramenta para juntar dados num formato 
compreensível. 
 Porém, o uso destes dados abre caminho a um novo problema com a chegada da Regulação 
Geral de Proteção de Dados (RGPD). As empresas estão agora a enfrentar um trade-off que pode 
comprometer o processamento de dados pessoais. A sua proteção com métodos de criptografia standard 
como o Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) deixa os dados num formato não processável, enquanto 
não os proteger de todo significa arriscar o pagamento das multas impostas pela RGPD, o que não só 
força as empresas a abortar os seus negócios de processamento de dados como ainda bloqueia a 
implementação de soluções novas. 
 Esta tese estuda um cenário real de uma aplicação de Inteligência Operacional cuja intenção é a 
de processar dados pessoais num futuro próximo. Este cenário assenta na descrição da aplicação cujas 
novas funcionalidades estão em stand-by devido à RGPD. A aplicação usa uma plataforma de 
inteligência operacional chamada Splunk, que sofre também do mesmo problema do trade-off. 
 A contribuição desta tese é a de avaliar se é possível proteger dados em conformidade com os 
requisitos da RGPD e ainda assim mantê-los num formato processável pela plataforma Splunk. Para este 
efeito foram testados e comparados diferentes algoritmos de criptografia em diferentes cenários de Big 
Data. 
 Quatro soluções diferentes foram apresentadas: Anonimização, Criptografia Simétrica usando 
AES, Criptografia Homomorfica usando Paillier e Criptografia Homomorfica usando SEAL.  
 A solução de anonimização foi usada como modo de destruição de dados que é especialmente 
eficaz na concretização do direito ao esquecimento imposto pelo GDPR, embora comprometa os direitos 
de acesso, retificação e portabilidade dos dados da regulação. A anonimização tem também o revés de 
deixar os dados num formato não processável irreversível. 
  A solução de criptografia simétrica usando AES satisfez todos os requisitos da RGPD e ainda 
foi particularmente eficiente em termos de performance, segurança e complexidade, tendo apenas 
falhado a usabilidade dos dados após a sua proteção. 
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 As soluções de criptografia homomorfica provaram ser eficientes quer em requisitos da RGPD 
quer em segurança, complexidade e usabilidade. No entanto, em termos de performance apenas a 
solução SEAL demonstrou potencial para ser aplicada numa aplicação de OI real. 
Por fim, foram propostas duas soluções finais que usam os pontos mais benéficos de cada uma 
das soluções acima descritas para atingir objetivos específicos de RGPD, performance, segurança, 
complexidade e usabilidade. O único fator que distingue estas soluções é o momento em que estas 
protegem os dados pessoais: antes do armazenamento dos dados ou na leitura dos mesmos.    
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1 Introduction 
In Big Data applications it’s easy to mishandle and/or misuse critical data. This problem becomes even 
more important with the arrival of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which entered into 
force on the 25th of May of 2018 on all EU countries. This regulation was designed to harmonize data 
privacy laws across all Europe and its main objective is to empower all EU citizens data privacy. 
This thesis focuses on a real-world Operational Intelligence solution that is implemented using the 
Splunk platform. The motivation behind this thesis is followed along with its objectives and 
contributions.  
1.1 Motivation 
More and more studies are being made to evaluate how well-prepared companies are for the arrival of 
GDPR, and basically all of them are concluding that business leaders are still confused about the 
regulation. Some of these studies go even further and say that roughly 90% of European companies are 
still not prepared and 40% have not started their preparations for the new regulations as of 20th of 
September of 2017 (Symcox, 2017). According to Veritas, 47% of organizations are expected not to 
meet the compliance guidelines (Stageberg, 2017). 
As of today, the company whose project this thesis focuses on is avoiding personal data collection so 
that it isn’t one of the aforementioned companies. Even though the processing of that same data brings 
good opportunities among their clients, the costs of not being complaint with GDPR are too immense to 
even consider such a possibility. 
The project in question is an Operational Intelligence application implemented in Splunk whose purpose 
is to give insight into the ESBs of interested clients, by collecting and analysing its reliability, 
performance, volume and concurrency metrics. This application is currently being used by clients of the 
Telecommunications area where the processing of personal data opens good opportunities on the 
profiling of their customers. This makes it clear that the main gap on this project is that it doesn’t have 
any way of profiling those customers, even though the customer information that arrives in the ESB of 
those companies is already sufficient for that matter. 
Splunk does already offer the means to protect personal data in order to be compliant with GDPR, 
nevertheless, none of them offers means of processing that data without decrypting it first (Splunk, 
2017). As suggested by Splunk, one could protect the data before it is stored but, with the current 
standard encryption methods that are considered by Splunk (eg.: AES), the data would be on a format 
that can no longer be processed, which gets us back to the original problem of not processing the data 
at all or risking the penalties that are enforced by GDPR. 
Nevertheless, a new kind of encryption seems to be increasing in popularity to face this problem. 
Homomorphic encryption offers the possibility to process data even after it is already encrypted, which 
seems to be a good way to go. 
1.2 Objectives 
The objective of this thesis is to build a solution that is both compliant with GDPR and processable by 
Splunk. This should be done in a manner that the non-functional requirements like performance, 
security, usability and complexity of the OI application are compromised as little as possible. 
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In order to achieve this, the following secondary objectives need to be accounted on this thesis’ 
development: 
• Establish a simulation scenario that can be used to evaluate this thesis; 
• Identify possible encryption solutions, be they homomorphic or not, for different Operational 
Intelligence scenarios; 
• Compare those encryption solutions and identify pros and cons for each one of them; 
• Understand if these solutions are compliant with the General Data Protection Regulation. 
1.3 Contribution 
This thesis contributes with a data protection requirement analysis that is compliant with GDPR, while 
also establishing which data can be processed, which should be protected and which should not be 
processed at all. Non-functional requirements like performance, security, usability and complexity are 
also be established. 
For this matter, different Splunk architectures were tested along with both symmetric and homomorphic 
encryption algorithms, thus allowing a direct comparison between multiple prototypes on the 
aforementioned requirements. 
Based on those prototypes, a few solution proposals were made in the end of this report with different 
trade-offs in the requirements that they comply with. 
1.4 Document structure 
First, all background work that was found to support the objectives of this thesis is introduced in Section 
2. This section highlights the most important articles of the General Data Protection Regulation, some 
encryption techniques that should be considered and the main concepts that drive the studied OI 
application, namely SOA, ESB, Operational Intelligence and Splunk. 
Section 3 follows with the analysis and design of both the objectives and contribution of this thesis. It 
makes an introduction of the studied OI application by explaining what are its involved subjects, its use 
cases, operations and types of data, which lead up to the scenarios and requirements that should be 
considered on the “04 Prototypes” and “05 Proposed Solutions” sections. 
Section 4 starts by introducing the business scenario of the OI solution and, based on that, analyses four 
possible prototypes, along with the technical decisions that were made. Having in mind these prototypes, 
two final solution proposals are made using the best qualities of each. 
Finally, section 5 builds a conclusion upon all the work that was done on this thesis. The document ends 
with a full list of references that were made on the text of this document. 
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2 Background work 
This thesis addresses the General Data Protection Regulation, along with its main concepts and articles, 
addresses the most well-known encryption techniques and uses Splunk as its operational intelligence 
platform to give insight on data of SOA driven ESBs. 
2.1 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
The GDPR lays down rules regarding the protection of natural persons’ personal data and the movement 
of that data within the EU. This regulation applies to any organization that collects or processes any 
personal data of EU residents, be they inside or outside the Union, which means that most of the 
worldwide organizations will have to deal with this regulation at some point. 
2.1.1 Scope 
In regard to operational intelligence applications, the following key concepts are defined on the GDPR: 
Personal data:  
“’personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular 
by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier 
or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity of that natural person”. (General Data Protection Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, 
n.d.) 
Processing: 
“‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets 
of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, 
structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, 
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or 
destruction”. (General Data Protection Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, n.d.) 
Controller: 
“‘controller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or 
jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the 
purposes and means of such processing are determined by Union or Member State law, the controller 
or the specific criteria for its nomination may be provided for by Union or Member State law;” (General 
Data Protection Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, n.d.) 
Processor: 
“‘processor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes 
personal data on behalf of the controller;” (General Data Protection Regulation - Final text neatly 
arranged, n.d.) 
2.1.2 Principles 
In regard to operational intelligence applications, the following principles from GDPR should be 
considered. 
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a. Processing of personal data (art. 5) 
Personal data should be processed according to the following principles: 
• Purpose limitation - “Collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes” 
• Data minimisation - “Adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the 
purposes for which they are processed”. 
• Accuracy - “Accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date”, meaning that, when inaccurate, 
the data should be erased or rectified without delay. 
• Storage limitation - “Kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer 
than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed”. 
• Integrity and confidentiality - “Processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of 
the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and 
against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational 
measures”. 
In summary, the controller/processor should have as less personal data as possible, should have accurate 
data, should get rid of the data when it is no longer needed and should protect the data while it is being 
used/stored. 
b. Processing of special categories of personal data (art. 9) 
Processing is prohibited for the following types of personal data: 
• Racial or ethnic origin; 
• Political opinions; 
• Religious/philosophical beliefs; 
• Trade union membership; 
• Genetic data; 
• Biometric data; 
• Health; 
• Sex life; 
• Sexual orientation. 
The above types of personal data can still be processed if: 
• “Data subject gives explicit consent”; 
• “Processing is necessary for carrying out obligations and exercising specific rights of the 
controller or of the data subject in the field of employment and social security and social 
protection law”; 
• “Processing relates to personal data which are manifestly made public by the data subject”; 
• “Processing is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or 
whenever courts are acting in their judicial capacity”; 
• “Processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical 
research purposes or statistical purposes”; 
For operational intelligence purposes, these types of data should be protected right away and can only 
be used for statistical purposes. Still, the controller/processor should be able to revert the protection 
using appropriate methods, in case it faces a legal claim. 
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c. Processing which does not require identification (art. 11) 
According to the regulation, the controller is not obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional 
information to identify the data subject if the data in question does not require the data subject’s 
identification. 
This will be essential for data bulks that have no personal data, for which companies can simply use the 
data without any preoccupation.  
2.1.3 Rights of the data subject 
According to GDPR, data subjects have the following rights regarding their personal data. 
a. Right of access by the data subject (art. 15) 
The data subject has the right to obtain confirmation as to which personal data concerning him is being 
processed and what are its purposes. The following information can be obtained: 
• Purposes of the processing; 
• Categories of the personal data; 
• Recipients or categories of recipient to whom the data is or can be disclosed; 
• Envisaged period for which the personal data will be stored; 
• Copy of the personal data currently undergoing processing. 
b. Right to rectification (art. 16) 
The data subject has the right to have innacurate personal data that concerns him rectified without undue 
delay. 
c. Right to be forgotten (art. 17) 
The data subject has the right to erasure of all personal data concearning him or her without undue delay. 
d. Right to data portability (art. 20) 
The data subject has the right to receive all the personal data concerning him or her in a well-enough 
structured format that allows that same data to be transmitted to another controller. 
2.1.4 Controller and processor 
The controller is, according to the GDPR, responsible to determine the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data. On the other hand the processor is someone or some entity that works for 
the controller, processing personal data on his behalf. 
This section shows some important articles regarding controllers and processors. 
a. Data protection by default and by design (art. 25) 
When personal data is not needed for specific purposes, it should be protected using appropriate 
technical and organisational measures. The regulation refers to pseudonymisation as an example of one 
of these measures. 
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These measures should take into account the amount of data, extent of their processing, the period of 
their storage and their accessibility. 
b. Records of processing activities (art. 30) 
According to the regulation, the controller should maintain a record of its processing activities. This 
record should contain the following information: 
• Name and contact details of the controller; 
• Purposes of the processing; 
• Description of the categories of data subjects and their personal data; 
• Categories of recipients to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed; 
• Envisaged time limits for erasure, if possible; 
• General description of the technical and organisational security measures. 
c. Security of processing (art. 32) 
The controller and the processor need to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, which includes: 
• Pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data; 
• Ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of processing 
systems and services; 
2.2 Access control 
Access control is a security technique that is used to specify what users can do, which resources they 
can access and what operations they can perform on those resources in a computing environment. For 
the purposes of this thesis, only the Role Based Access Control will be used, which already comes as 
part of the Splunk platform. 
2.2.1 Role-Based Access Control (RoBAC) 
The role-based access control policy assigns permissions to particular roles on an organization. Users 
are then assigned to a role as appropriate. 
2.3 Encryption 
For the purposes of this thesis, three types of encryption will be considered: 
• Symmetric Encryption 
• Asymmetric encryption  
• Homomorphic encryption 
Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 were based on the book “Computer Security: Principles and Practice (Stallings 
& Brown, 2015), while section 2.3.3 was based on the book “Homomorphic Encryption and 
Applications” (Yi, Paulet, & Bertino, 2014). 
2.3.1 Symmetric encryption 
As the name suggests, this type of encryption algorithm uses the same key to both encrypt and decrypt 
data, which makes the key symmetric in terms of usage. In practical terms, this key represents a secret 
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that is shared between two interested entities. Figure 2.1 illustrates the course of action of this type of 
encryption. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 - Symmetric encryption scheme 
There are two types of Symmetric Ciphers: 
• Stream ciphers - ciphers that process input elements in a continuous fashion, producing output 
for each element individually. 
• Block ciphers – ciphers that process the input in blocks of elements, producing an output for 
each block individually. 
a. DES 
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) was implemented in 1977 by the American government with the 
objective of encrypting/decrypting non-classified data. This algorithm has been criticized ever since due 
to the low size of the keys it uses, for having that are not clear in terms of purpose and for being easily 
broken by a lot of already known algorithms. 
This algorithm uses a block length of 64 bits and keys of 56 bits. It is a minor variation of the Feistel 
network, which is illustrated on Figure 2.2, with 16 rounds and 16 subkeys that are generated from the 
original 56 bit key. 
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Figure 2.2 - Feistel Network 
In the Feistel network we start by having a plaintext block with 2w bits of length and a key K. Then, the 
alogorithm performs the following steps: 
1. The plaintext is divided in two halves, L0 and R0, of equal size w. 
2. A subkey Ki is generated from the original key K with a subskey generation algorithm. 
3. The right half of the data is used on the round funtion F along with a subkey Ki. 
4. A substitution is performed on the left half of the data by taking the exclusive-OR (XOR) of 
itself and the output of the function F. 
5. The result of the substitution on the left side goes to the right side while the right side goes to 
the left side unchanged. 
6. Repeat for N rounds. 
7. Merge the resulting left and right halves into a final ciphertext with 2w bits. 
b. Triple DES 
Triple DES (3DES) was standardized with the objective of being used on financial applications in 1985, 
being also incorporated as part of the Data encryption Standard in 1999. 
This algorithm uses three keys and three executions of the DES algorithm, following an encrypt-decrypt-
encrypt sequence, as shown on Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3 - Triple DES scheme 
c. AES 
The Advanced Encryption Standard was implemented with the purpose of being the federal information 
processing standard and replacing the publicly considered weak counterparts DES and Triple DES. 
This algorithm uses a block length of 128 bits and a key length that can be 128, 192 or 256 bits. It is 
composed by one permutation stage and three substitution stages: 
1. Substitute bytes – Uses a table named “S-box” to perform a byte-by-byte substitution of the 
block; 
2. Shift rows – A simple permutation that is performed row-by-row; 
3. Mix columns – A substitution that alters each byte in a column as a function of all its bytes.; 
4. Add round key – A simple bitwise XOR of the current block with a portion of the expanded 
key. 
These stages are then repeated for 10 rounds, before reaching the intended cypher-text. Figure 2.4 
illustrates the whole process. 
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Figure 2.4 - AES scheme 
2.3.2 Asymmetric encryption 
Also known as Public-Key Encryption, Asymmetric Encryption is, as the name suggests, the algorithm 
that uses keys that are asymmetric, meaning that they can only be used for either encryption or 
decryption, never both at the same time.  
Two keys are needed in this algorithm, one which is known as the public key and the other which is the 
private key. The public key is known by all the involved entities while the private key is supposed to be 
known only by the entity to which it belongs to. This also means that different results can be achieved 
when we use one or the other for the encryption: 
1. Encrypting with the public key of entity X forces the decryption to be done with the private key 
of entity X, which is a way of guaranteeing that only entity X is able to read the date in clear-
text- 
   
 
11 
 
2. Encrypting with the private key of entity X can only be done on the entity X’s premises and is 
a way for entity X to prove its identity. 
a. RSA 
This algorithm was developed in 1977 and remains to this day as the most widely accepted approach to 
public-key encryption. RSA is a block cipher in which plaintext and ciphertext are integers between 0 
and n-1 for some n. Encryption and decryption are of the following form, for some plaintext block M 
and ciphertext block C: 
C = 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 
M = 𝐶𝑑  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 = (𝑀𝑒)𝑑  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 =  𝑀𝑒𝑑  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 
It is assumed that both sender and receiver must know the values of n and e, and only the receiver knows 
the value of d. The public and private keys are here represented on the following form: 
Public key: PU = {e,n} 
Private key: PR = {d,n} 
This algorithm is only satisfactory when the following requirements are met: 
1. It is possible to find values of e, d, n such that 𝑀𝑒𝑑  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 = 𝑀, for all M < n. 
2. It is relatively easy to calculate 𝑀𝑒 and 𝐶𝑑 for all values of M < n. 
3. It is infeasible to determine d given e and n. 
2.3.3 Homomorphic encryption  
Homomorphic encryption is the category of encryption that allows computation to be performed on 
encrypted data. The purpose is to have exactly the same result after decrypting the data as if the 
computation was done on plaintext. 
Homomorphic encryption can be either partially homomorphic or fully homomorphic. 
a. Fully homomorphic schemes 
These homomorphic encryption schemes allow any kind of computation to be performed on the 
encrypted data, without any limitation. This is by far the most powerful scheme since it allows for any 
desirable functionality to be implemented. 
In practical terms, homomorphic encryption schemes have no clear solution yet, since it wasn’t yet found 
a formula that can be applied without doubt to any kind of data, be it numeric or alpha-numeric. 
b. Partially homomorphic schemes 
This homomorphic encryption scheme only allows a subset of operations to be performed on the 
encrypted data while ensuring that the decryption returns the expected result. 
These schemes are usually based on conventional cryptography and, as such, share the same 
performance and security levels. 
Unpadded RSA 
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If the RSA public key is modulus m and exponent e, then the encryption of a message x is given by: ℇ(x) 
= 𝑥𝑒mod m. The homomorphic property is then:  
ℇ(x1). ℇ(x2) = 𝑥1
𝑒𝑥2
𝑒mod m = (𝑥1𝑥2)
𝑒 mod m = ℇ(x1.x2) 
ElGamal 
In the ElGamal cryptosystem, in a cyclic group G of order q with generator g, if the public key is 
(G,q,g,h), where h = 𝑔𝑥, and x is the secret key, then the encryption of a message m is ℇ(m) = (𝑔𝑟,m. ℎ𝑟), 
for some random r ∈ {0,…,q-1}. The homomorphic property is then: 
ℇ(m1).ℇ(m2) = (𝑔𝑟1,m1. ℎ𝑟1) (𝑔𝑟2,m2. ℎ𝑟2) = (𝑔𝑟1+𝑟2,(m1.m2). ℎ𝑟1+𝑟2) = ℇ(m1.m2) 
Goldwasser-Micali 
In the Golwasser-Micali cryptosystem, if the public key is the modulus m and quadratic non-residue x, 
then the encryption of a bit b is ℇ(b) = 𝑥𝑏𝑟2 mod m, for some random r ∈ {0,…,m-1}. The homomorphic 
property is then: 
ℇ(m1).ℇ(m2) = 𝑥𝑏1  𝑟1
2𝑥𝑏2𝑟2
2 mod m = 𝑥𝑏1+𝑏2 (𝑟1 𝑟2)
2 mod m = ℇ(b1 ⊕ b2) 
Benaloh 
In the Benaloh cryptosystem, if the public key is the modulus m and the base g with blocksize of c, then 
the encryption of a message x is ℇ(x) = 𝑔𝑥𝑟𝑐 mod m, for some random r ∈ {0,…,m-1}. The homomorphic 
property is then: 
ℇ(m1).ℇ(m2) mod m = (𝑔𝑥1  𝑟1
𝑐) (𝑔𝑥2 𝑟2
𝑐) mod m = 𝑔𝑥1+𝑥2  (𝑟1 𝑟2)
𝑐 = ℇ(𝑥1 +  𝑥2) 
Paillier 
In the Paillier cryptosystem, if the public key is the modulus m and the base g, the encryption of a 
message x is ℇ(x) = 𝑔𝑥𝑟𝑚 mod 𝑚2, for some random r ∈ {0,…,m-1}. The homomorphic property is 
then: 
ℇ(x1).ℇ(x2) = (𝑔𝑥1  𝑟1
𝑚) (𝑔𝑥2  𝑟2
𝑚) mod 𝑚2 = 𝑔𝑥1+𝑥2 (𝑟1𝑟2)
𝑚 mod 𝑚2 = ℇ(x1 + x2) 
2.4 Operational Intelligence Application 
Operational Intelligence is a category of real-time business analytics whose main objective is to give 
insight into data, be it on the form of streaming events or business operations. This data insight allows 
users to take conclusions in regard to the system’s performance, threats and process workflow while 
correlating them together to reveal patterns, detect events, identify anomalies and come up with a 
solution.   
The Operational Intelligence application in study has 4 main components: Probe, Forwarders, 
Indexers and Search Heads.  
Probe is the component that collects the data from the ESB that the OI application monitors. 
Forwarders are the components that consume the data and forward it to Indexers. They reside on the 
machines from where the data originates and do little or no work on the data, forwarding it in a raw 
format. 
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Indexers are the components that process the incoming machine data, converting them from 
unstructured data to structured data. This data is stored on indexes as events, which can later on be 
interpreted in different ways by search heads.  
Search heads are the components that allow users to search the already indexed data. The results of 
these searches can be returned in the form of field value pairs or consolidated/processed in some way, 
according to the user’s needs. 
Figure 2.5 illustrates of the OI solution showcasing the aforementioned components (in green), the ESB 
that is being monitored and the surrounding environment. 
 
Figure 2.5 - OI solution architecture diagram 
In summary, a probe was installed on the server on which the client application resides, so that all the 
data that is needed to monitor the environment can be obtained to perform the OI studies. This data is 
then sent by this probe to a forwarder server that resides on that same machine. 
The forwarder sends all the data in raw format to the indexer servers, where it is indexed thus becoming 
structured. 
Finally, the OI users login in to the OI application on the Search Head and use it to consult the events 
that were collected throughout this process. 
2.5 Splunk 
The Operational Intelligence solutions that are analysed on this thesis are all implemented in Splunk. 
Splunk uses the same concepts as shown on section 2.4 regarding the operational intelligence 
application, meaning that typically it has: 
• A target system where a probe should reside; 
• Forwarders; 
• Indexers; 
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• Search heads. 
Each one of these components handles data that may include personal information. All the concepts that 
will be introduced on the following sections were taken from Splunk’s documentation pages (Splunk, 
2017). 
2.5.1 Splunk data pipeline 
Splunk has 3 tiers to handle data: 
Tier Splunk server that is responsible for this tier 
Data input Forwarder 
Indexing Indexer 
Search management Search Head 
Table 2.1 - Splunk data pipeline tiers 
Figure 2.6 illustrates the route that data takes through these tiers, which is called data pipeline. 
 
Figure 2.6 - Splunk data pipeline 
On the input tier, Splunk acquires raw data from the source and breaks it into equally sized blocks 
(64K). Metadata like the source type, the specific source and the host is also obtained on this tier. Events 
are still non-existent on this phase, meaning that the data is still in its original format. 
The indexing tier is composed by a parsing phase and an indexing phase. During the parsing phase, 
Splunk does the following: 
• Breaks the data streams into single lines; 
• Identifies, parses and sets timestamps; 
• Adds source-wide keys that were created at input time; 
• Transforms event data and metadata based on regular expressions.  
During the indexing phase, Splunk writes events on the indexer’s disk and indexes: 
• Compressed raw data files; 
• Corresponding index files. 
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The search tier defines how each user accesses, views and uses indexed data. This is basically where 
users create the analytics that’ll be shown to the end client. 
2.5.2 Conversion to structured data 
The conversion of incoming unstructured data is done during the indexing tier and is directly related 
with the way Splunk processes incoming data and stores it in indexes, which are basically repositories 
for data. As was explained on section 2.5.1, indexing is where raw data is converted into searchable 
events.  
It’s during the parsing phase of the indexing tier that data manipulation is done. Here, Splunk: 
• Extracts a set of default fields for each event, including host, source, and sourcetype; 
• Configures character set encoding; 
• Identifies line termination using line-breaking rules. While many events are short and only take 
up a line or two, others can be long; 
• Identifies timestamps or creates them if they don't exist. At the same time that it processes 
timestamps, Splunk identifies event boundaries; 
• Masks sensitive event data, if the appropriate configuration was done for that. It can also be 
configured to apply custom metadata to incoming events. 
The masking of sensitive data is the key action here and it’s essential to know how Splunk is able to 
identify this type of data. Splunk has 2 ways of anonymizing data: 
• With regular expression (regex) transformations; 
• With “sed” scripts. 
a. Regex transformations 
This type of anonymization requires the user to configure two Splunk configuration files: 
• props.conf – where the wanted transformation classes are specified for specific sourcetypes, 
hosts or sources; 
• transforms.conf – where the actual transformation classes are implemented with the regex that 
matches the data to anonymize. 
b. sed Script 
This type of anonymization requires the user to create a sed script. Sed is a Unix utility that reads a file 
and modifies the input as specified by a list of commands. The script needs to be configured first on the 
props.conf file in a similar way as in regex transformations. 
Splunk allows 2 types of sed commands: 
• replace – Uses regex to find an expression and replaces that expression by a given string. 
• character substitution – Searches for a specific set of characters and replaces them by a set of 
given characters. 
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2.5.3 Data obfuscation and Field Protection 
As was presented on Splunk’s “.conf17” (Splunk, 2017), we have several options when implementing a 
solution that protects data on Splunk. This section explains those options having in mind that the data 
protection on the transport level is already assured by Splunk with safe channels (using TLS). 
a. Application 
On this option, it is the data source’s responsibility to protect the data before sending it to the Splunk 
system. This implies that little to no latency is introduced to the system and security is very high but at 
the same time is a bit complex since this implementation needs to be prepared for each client that will 
use the Splunk implemented solution (different client, different data). Also, the usability is not the best 
since this implies that the client needs to protect all data that is thrown to Splunk, even data that was just 
now introduced, which most likely won’t happen. 
Option Layer Latency Security Complexity Usability 
Application Data source Low Very High Medium Medium 
Table 2.2 – Splunk’s data protection options - Application 
b. Modular input / Batch processing  
This option protects the data on the forwarder with encryption, pseudonymization and anonymization. 
This offers high usability and security since it allows specific operations to be performed on certain 
events or types of data which can protect the data while leaving it still usable (eg.: Format preserving 
encryption). Nevertheless, it is complex to implement such a solution and it induces delay due to the 
API calls. 
Option Layer Latency Security Complexity Usability 
Modular 
Input / Batch 
processing 
Data Medium High High High 
Table 2.3 - Splunk’s data protection options - Modular input/Batch processing 
c. External Processor 
This option requires an external processor, which in itself is an additional solution that should be 
implemented from scratch, updated each time a new client starts using the Splunk solution an 
maintained. Obviously, this is the solution with the highest complexity and has still medium latency due 
to the API calls to the processor. Nevertheless, this solution offers also important advantages in terms 
of usability and security. 
In terms of architecture, the external processor receives the data that needs to be protected from the 
forwarder and then send it to the indexer. 
Option Layer Latency Security Complexity Usability 
External 
Processor 
Data Medium High High High 
Table 2.4 - Splunk’s data protection options - External Processor 
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d. Regex Replace 
This option protects the data on the indexer by replacing it with some other value each time a regular 
expression is matched. This has a high security and low complexity as the main positive aspects since it 
anonymizes the data and is quite simple to configure. Nevertheless, it adds latency to the system and is 
not usable on search time, due to that same anonymization. 
Option Layer Latency Security Complexity Usability 
Regex 
Replace 
Data Medium High Low Low 
Table 2.5 - Splunk’s data protection options - Regex Replace 
e. Scheduled Search 
This solution protects the data with scheduled searches that are configured to find sensitive data from 
time to time and run a script that protects them. Of all the options, this is the most expensive one in 
terms of latency, obviously. It also offers poor security, because between different scheduled searches, 
the data will remain unprotected. Finally, the complexity and usability of this solution is medium 
because the searches that find sensitive data are not straightforward and the latency affects the usability. 
Option Layer Latency Security Complexity Usability 
Scheduled 
Search 
Data Very High Low Medium Medium 
Table 2.6 - Splunk’s data protection options - Scheduled Search 
f. Result Masking 
This option is implemented on the presentation layer instead of the data layer as in the options above. 
This is the most common solutions since it is “good enough” for approximately 90% of the scenarios, 
since it offers really high usability and really low complexity. Nevertheless, if offers low security 
because the data is stored in clear on all components of Splunk and offers a bit of latency as well on the 
presentation of data, since the protection is done there. 
Data can be protected with 3 different methods in Splunk: 
• Anonymization – uses SHA256 hash. 
• Pseudonymization - uses AES256 encryption. 
• Format preserving Pseudonymization - Based on AES as well but preserves the original format. 
Option Layer Latency Security Complexity Usability 
Result 
Masking 
Presentation Medium Low Low High 
Table 2.7 - Splunk’s data protection options - Result Masking 
g. Options Summary 
In the realm of Operational Intelligence, the most desirable solution would be to have as much Usability 
as possible while having a high level of Security. Table 2.7 already shows that no such solution exists 
at the moment. In order to have good security, one needs to compromise on Usability, and vice-versa.  
Option Layer Latency Security Complexity Usability 
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Application Data source Low Very High Medium Medium 
Modular 
Input / Batch 
processing 
Data Medium High High High 
External 
Processor 
Data Medium High High High 
Regex 
Replace 
Data Medium High Low Low 
Scheduled 
Search 
Data Very High Low Medium Medium 
Result 
Masking 
Presentation Medium Low Low High 
Table 2.8 - All Splunk data protection options 
2.5.4 Access control 
Splunk already comes with a built-in Role Based Access Control policy that can be applied at search 
time. This policy has 3 types of users: 
Role Description 
User Intended for the common user that edits its own 
searches, knowledge objects. This user can only 
see its own objects or objects that are specifically 
shared to him. 
Power-User Intended for users that can edit all shared objects, 
alerts, tag events and other similar tasks. 
Administrator Intended for administrators that are able to 
manage most of the system’s users. Has the most 
assigned capabilities (egs.: edit_roles, edit_user, 
edit_server,…) 
Table 2.9 - Splunk's access control roles 
New roles with different permissions can be added if needed. 
2.6 SOA 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is, as the name suggests, a software architecture where all 
functionalities that are implemented by the applications are available in the form of services. This 
architecture follows a consumer-provider philosophy, meaning that all functionalities are provided by 
some entity to another that consumes them. 
SOA defines a service as a unit of work representing a specific business function. This unit of work 
should be accessible through well-defined interfaces. Services are normally implemented using the 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) that provides a specification for message exchanging, and 
Representational State Transfer (REST) which is a set of principles that define how Web Standards 
should be used (Hurwitz, Bloor, Kaufman, & Halper, 2009). 
2.6.1 SOA Infrastructure 
SOA service infrastructure can be achieved with Service Enablement and Service Mediation. 
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a. Service Enablement 
Service Enablement relates to the service implementation part we use to enable services. If we want to 
adopt SOA practices, the first thing we have to do is search for some technology that already implements 
the service we want. This technology may already exist in our company, it may as well already work 
the way we want and by doing this we’re accelerating the process and saving funds for future service 
implementations. Service enablement can be achieved with an Enterprise Service Bus (ESB), which is 
also a mediator and works well with applications with good interfaces and can be achieved with an 
Application Wrapper that provides a way of using services that don’t have a formal interface by exposing 
running applications or internal programs as services. 
b. Service Mediation 
Service Mediation relates to the separation between service consumers and service providers. A service 
consumer should never connect directly to the service provider. If it does so, there’s absolutely no 
flexibility in our SOA practice regarding the changes we can make to our services. This is of extreme 
importance because services are constantly changing! New features, new requirements, corrections, new 
message formats, new programming languages, anything we can think of will most likely change in the 
future. To achieve service mediation, we have to implement virtual service that functions as a translator 
between services. By doing so, we achieve Loose coupling which is the property where service 
consumers are independent of the service provider’s location, transport and type of messages. This can 
be made with Proxies, ESB’s, Gateways and SOA appliances.  
2.6.2 Governance 
The only way to fight the aforementioned problems is by defining roles, policies and procedures and by 
enforcing those to all stakeholders. This is called Governance. The enforcement of this roles, policies 
and procedures can be made in design-time and run-time with checkpoints. 
Enforcement in design-time is made with registries, where we publish the available services and related 
metadata, SOA related assets, service provider organizations, service consumer systems or applications, 
service consumer organizations, policies, contracts, agreements and relations between all. What makes 
this method a checkpoint of policies is that all system artefacts must pass through the registry before 
being available to service consumers.  
Enforcement in run-time is made with Policy Enforcement Points (PEP), also known as Brokers. 
PEP’s provide a way of enforcing pre-established agreements between service providers and service 
consumers. PEP’s are the service-mediation layer of the SOA infrastructure, which we will see next. By 
enforcing policies in the mediation layer, we can apply policies without worrying about both service 
consumer and service provider locations and protocols and message differences. 
a. SOA Life Cycle 
Governance shouldn’t be a burden to workers. In fact it should always be seen as a way of helping the 
workers do their job. What usually happens is that workers publish a certain service on the registry, wait 
for the checkpoint and then have to restart all their work again because the service wasn’t compliant 
with the company policies.  
The main objective of life cycles is to fix the above issue by breaking the development process of a 
service into stages. In each stage, some person, that is responsible for some task, evaluates the work 
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according to the policies of the company. The normal service life cycle has requests made by a Business 
Owner, which are analysed and turned into service and process designs by an SOA Architect. These 
designs are then implemented by a developer on the develop stage who also makes tests for the same 
implementations. These tests are used by the Quality Manager to validate quality metrics, side-effects 
and non-functional requirements such as quality of service. The Operator receives the well-tested and 
validated solutions and starts the production stage, where he makes the solutions available for service 
consumers by implementing a virtual service. 
All the aforementioned stages of the SOA life cycle are illustrated on Figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.7 - SOA Life Cycle 
b. Composition 
SOA life cycles also imply that the stakeholders mentioned above can communicate with each other. 
This originates a new problem in that, most of the time, those same stakeholders have different languages 
and skills. A Business Owner may not know how to design services, an SOA Architect may not know 
what to implement a design, and so on.  
The commonly used solution is Business Process Management (BPM). BPM provides a way of 
composing and optimizing the SOA process by defining processes in a very graphical fashion, which 
results in a common language to all stakeholders. Figure 2.8 shows an example of a BPM model. 
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Figure 2.8 - Example of a Business Process Management model 
Another way of composing the SOA process is by developing Composite Applications. These 
technologies provide a new way of creating applications where all that is required is wiring up services 
into a rich user interface. This makes reuse of services accessible to everyone, since little or no code is 
required. 
c. Agility 
Composition and life cycles brings us to one big objective of SOA: Agility. Agility means the capability 
to rapidly and cost efficiently adapt to changes. To achieve agility, we have to ensure that all 
stakeholders use shared technical and organizational components and functions as well as good 
relationships to increase communication and reach a common goal. We need to assure a mindset where 
everyone understands that the service exists to deliver consumer satisfaction, methodology to cross 
project boundaries and improve communication, and challenges to the organization by defusing any 
conflicts between departments. Another way of increasing agility is by defining contracts. Contracts 
define an agreement between the non-functional requirements of consumers and providers, like 
performance, security, and so on. 
2.7 ESB 
The real-world OI solution that will be protected in the scope of this thesis gives insight into the 
execution of an Enterprise Service Bus (ESB).  
An ESB is a form of message-oriented middleware (MOM) system that implements the communication 
between software applications in a service oriented architecture (SOA) (Chappell, 2009). As illustrated 
on Figure 2.9, the primary responsibilities of an ESB are the following: 
• Routing of messages; 
• Monitoring and control message exchange; 
• Event handling; 
• Data transformation and mapping; 
• Message and event queueing/sequencing; 
• Protocol conversion; 
• Exception handling; 
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• Security. 
 
Figure 2.9 - Enterprise Service Bus 
2.8 Summary 
This section addressed GDPR, along with its main concepts and articles, encryption techniques, Splunk 
Operational Intelligence, SOA and ESB, which are the concepts that drive this thesis. 
GDPR focuses on the protection of personal data, empowering common individuals over their own data. 
This regulation specifies how this type of data should be handled/processed and how it should be 
protected, making it the main source of requirements for this thesis. 
On the other hand, the access control sub-section makes a small introduction into the Role-Based Access 
Control policy, which is the one that is used by Splunk. 
Symmetric, asymmetric and homomorphic encryption algorithms are introduced here as well as a way 
of protecting data. Both symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes represent the existing solutions 
that allow the protection of sensitive data without regard to the operations that were being executed on 
it. On the other hand, homomorphic encryption schemes represent the possibility of implementing 
operations that can be executed on encrypted data, to allow users without access to that kind of data to 
still do some amount of work in the scope of an organisation. 
This section also makes a quick introduction to the Operational Intelligence field of work, following 
immediately with its main platform, Splunk. Since this thesis focuses on the security side of data 
processing, themes like the different stages that data goes through on this platform are introduced. The 
different data protection options that are already offered by Splunk for each individual stage were 
introduced here along with their pros and cons. 
Finally, an introduction was made to the Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) and Enterprise Service 
Bus (ESB) concepts, which are tightly related with the OI application that will be improved in the scope 
of this thesis. 
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Section 3 introduces the model of current existing OI solution, by explaining its most important 
concepts, its architecture, the involved subjects, use cases, operations and the types of data that are 
affected by the solution.    
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3 Analysis and Design 
This section introduces the existing OI application, regarding its involved subjects, use cases, possible 
operations and types of the data. This solution is not yet GDPR compliant, so scenarios are identified 
for the solution along with performance, security, usability, complexity and control access requirements. 
3.1 Solution introduction 
The OI solution is used to give real time analytics regarding business events of targeted clients. It focuses 
on middleware environments, namely: 
• Enterprise Application Integration (EAI). 
• Enterprise Service Bus (ESB); 
• Service Oriented Architecture (SOA); 
This solution tracks the path from the client system to the backend systems that are invoked by SOA 
services, giving insight into the operation of the entire system. This insight includes metrics like 
reliability (percentage of errors), performance (response time), volume/load (number of requests per 
second) and concurrency (number of parallel requests in any instant). Figure 3.1 shows the context 
diagram of the OI solution. 
 
Figure 3.1 - OI solution context diagram 
The OI solution is implemented in Splunk. All assumptions are made with this platform in mind, even 
though they’re no different on other platforms. Exceptions are mentioned as needed.  
3.1.1 Subjects 
The OI solution is currently used by 2 types of subjects: client-side users and internal users. 
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a. Client-side subjects 
Client-side subjects reside on clients and can only have access to certain applications of the overall 
product, based on the agreement with the client. 
The following subjects are the most common ones on the scope of this OI solution (EAI, ESB and SOA): 
Subject Responsibilities 
Application Maintenance (AM) + 
Service Manager (SM) 
- Alarms that are related with the results of SOA 
service execution; 
- Identification of system degradation; 
- Root-Cause analysis. 
CM - Pre-Release vs Post-Release configuration 
comparison; 
- Alarms for frequent configuration problems. 
Testers - Test documentation and verification; 
- Problem resolution agility.  
IT Architects - Live documentation of the physical and logical 
infrastructure; 
- SOA Governance catalogue enrichment; 
- Real utilization of SOA services; 
- Analytic capacity to support architecture decisions. 
Security specialists - Search all accesses on assets (eg.: SOA services) by 
using MSISDNs or Account numbers as searching 
keys); 
- Business security. 
Analysts - SOA service analysis that is based on utilization, by 
historical statistics and by concrete scenario 
investigation (inputs, outputs, errors,…); 
- Transaction history analysis to support volume 
estimates for new processes. 
Managers - Business KPIs that are based on technical or 
functional data; 
- Real time visibility of business processes; 
- Analytic reporting of operations (eg.: web and call 
centers). 
Developers - Development of the OI solution; 
- Contact with all the above information, depending 
on the requirements that are given by administrators. 
Administrators - Responsible for all the actions of the OI solution; 
- Can give user access to different apps and info of the 
OI solution. 
Table 3.1 - Client-side subjects 
b. Internal users 
Internal users participate on the design and implementation of the product. 
Subject Responsibilities 
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Developers - Development of the OI solution; 
- Contact with all the above information, depending 
on the requirements that are given by administrators. 
System Administrators - Configuration of the OI solution; 
- Contact with all the above information, depending 
on the requirements that are given by administrators. 
Administrators - Responsible for all the actions of the OI solution; 
- Can give user access to different apps and info of the 
OI solution. 
Table 3.2 - Internal user subjects 
3.1.2 Use cases 
Similarly to the types of subjects, the use cases can also be divided into 2 types:  
• Metrics – used by client-side subjects; 
• Internal – used by internal subjects. 
a. Metrics 
As was mentioned in section 3.1, the OI solution focuses on Reliability, Performance, Volume/Load 
and Concurrency metrics. These types of use cases are more commonly performed by client-side users. 
Having this in mind, the following use cases are common: 
Metric type Use case Security impact (1-5) 
Reliability Find which backend failed. N/A  
 Check which input originated 
the failure. 
4 – Inputs may contain 
costumer data (which is 
personal more usual than not). 
 Check if authentication failed in 
some system. 
4 - May expose personal info if 
we’re dealing with a Billing 
backend system for example.  
Performance Compare response times of 
distinct clients.  
N/A 
 Check if some system is slower 
than usual. 
N/A 
 Evaluate performance 
evolution. 
N/A 
Volume/Load Find delays in batch processes.  
 Find duplicate requests. 3 – Requests may contain 
costumer data, although 
duplicate requests are not as 
common.  
Concurrency Count the number of parallel 
requests. 
5 – It’s almost certain that 
costumer data will be found on 
a system that works entirely in 
parallel due to its asynchronous 
nature. 
Table 3.3 - Metric related use cases 
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b. Internal 
Internal use cases are, as the name suggests, related with internal users. Internal users often need to dig 
deeper into the raw data that is collected by the OI application to understand how to proceed in the 
implementation of new features or bug fixes. 
The most common are the following: 
Use case Security impact (1-5) 
Get service pipelines/payloads. 5 – Service pipelines/payloads are basically the 
data that is in memory during the execution of 
some service. Service pipelines/payloads are 
expected to have sensitive personal information.   
Get service inputs/outputs. 5 – Inputs may contain costumer data (which is 
personal more usual than not). This use case has 
more security impact than the reliability metric 
one due to the fact that it can be done on literally 
every service. On the contrary, the reliability 
metric use case regarding inputs only searches for 
the input that failed, making it less probable to 
find sensitive data, 
Table 3.4 - Internal user related use cases 
3.1.3 Operations 
The OI application is expected to perform read operations on the original (unstructured) data. Data can 
be read directly via searches that show the raw data that was collected or via Operational Intelligence 
analytics that build reports and dashboards. The latter can be built by applying the operations that are 
show on Table 3.5. 
Operation type Description Examples 
Streaming Operates on each event as it is 
returned by a search. 
• eval – calculates an 
expression and puts the 
resulting value into a 
results field; 
• fields – specifies which 
fields should be 
shown/not shown; 
• rename – renames a 
field. 
Transforming Orders the search results into a 
data table by transforming the 
specified fields into numerical 
values. 
• chart – returns the 
results in a table format 
and makes it possible to 
display them as charts; 
• stats – calculates 
aggregate statistics like 
averages, sums, etc; 
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• top – returns the most 
common values for the 
specified fields; 
• rare - returns the rarest 
values for the specified 
fields; 
Generating Fetches information from the 
indexes, without any 
transformations. 
• search; 
• dbinspect - returns 
information about 
Splunk indexes; 
• inputcsv - loads search 
results from a specified 
.csv file, which is 
typically a lookup).  
Dataset processing Run having in mind the entire 
dataset. 
• sort - sorts the events 
based on a specified 
field and order; 
• eventstats – adds 
summary statistics to 
all results; 
• dedup – eliminates 
duplicate events. 
Table 3.5 - OI solution’s read operation types 
No execution operations are done though. The objective of this product is to monitor system’s operations 
and return analytic results. It’s not the product’s responsibility to provide tools to react upon those 
analytics. 
3.1.4 Data 
The existing OI application deals with data from the following sources: 
Configuration Examples 
ESB configurations Publish-Subscribe Message Delivery 
configurations 
Publishable documents 
Available queues 
Maximum number of 
publishable documents 
Server configurations Maximum DB connections 
Users 
Access control lists (ACL) 
Agent logs 
Agent configurations 
Runtime 
configurations 
Service execution metadata Execution time 
Error code 
Inputs and outputs of services Calling system 
Request/ESB info 
Personal data like: 
• Person name 
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• Person age 
• Person address 
• … 
Infrastructure data Available disk size 
Percentage of used CPU 
Percentage of used memory 
Server data Connection pool 
Memory usage 
Table 3.6 - Data types that are collected by the OI application 
a. Personal Data Estimate 
Of the above data types, the inputs and outputs of services are the ones where personal data might be 
collected. As of today, the application, namely its agent, is configured to collect all data except for 
personal data, due to the already mentioned penalties that are enforced by GDPR. Due to this, it’s not 
known for certain what would be the total amount of personal data that would be collected. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the amount of personal data is considered as being 1% of the total amount 
of data that the agent collects without the aforementioned restriction. 
3.2 Personal Data 
Each type of personal data can have different interpretations on the level of sensitivity it has. One might 
say that leaving the age of a person in clear is not as critical as doing the same with their gender or name, 
while at the same time the individual itself might not care about protecting his or her data, be it whatever 
it is. 
As of today, the OI application is still not manipulating any form of personal data. Nevertheless, it is 
one of the objectives to start that manipulation in a near future. Thus, it is of the biggest importance that 
types of personal data are identified along with their proper treatment in the scope of this application 
and of the GDPR. 
This section has the objective of identifying types of data that are expected to be collected in the future 
and specify an appropriate protection for them according to GDPR. 
3.2.1 Types of data 
For the purposes of this thesis, the following types of personal data were considered: 
• Name 
• Age 
• Address 
• Gender 
• Identification Numbers (eg.: social number, billing number,…) 
• Email 
• Phone Number 
• Birthdate 
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a. Application analysis 
The following questions need to be answered for each type of data that was listed above: 
• Is it needed? Why? 
• Where can it be used on the scope of this application? 
• Which security scenario is more appropriate? (Should the date be destroyed, protected, 
access controlled…?) 
Type of data Is it needed? Why? Where can it be 
used? 
Which security 
scenario? 
Name No.  The identification number 
is a better identifier. 
Encryption in case the 
name is needed for some 
scenario in the future. 
Age Yes. It is useful to infer the most 
popular age among bought 
products or the age where 
most people don’t have 
products to attract them as 
clients as well.  
Protection using 
encryption. 
Address Yes. It is useful to infer regions 
where certain products are 
bought the most. 
Not the whole address is 
needed, so part of it might 
be anonymized, while the 
remainder might simply 
be protected with 
encryption. 
Gender    
Identification Number Yes. It is useful as an unique 
identifier of the client. 
Protection using 
encryption. 
Email No. Email is merely used as a 
contact point with the 
client. 
Protection with 
encryption. 
Phone Number Yes. Might be useful to infer the 
country where the client 
lives, if the address doesn’t 
have that information. 
Not the whole phone 
number is needed, so part 
of it might be 
anonymized, while the 
remainder might simply 
be protected with 
encryption. 
Birthdate Yes. Might be useful to infer the 
age of the client, if that 
same field doesn’t exist or 
was protected. 
Not the whole birthdate is 
needed if only an 
approximate age is 
calculated, so part of it 
might be anonymized, 
while the remainder might 
simply be protected with 
encryption. 
Table 3.7 - Data types analysis according to the OI application 
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b. GDPR analysis 
Having GDPR in mind, the following questions need to be answered for each type of data that was listed 
above: 
• Is protection mandatory? 
• Is it processable according to GDPR? 
• What is the appropriate protection? 
Also, the answers to these questions need to have in mind the following statements about personal data: 
Type of data Is protection 
mandatory? 
Is it processable 
according to GDPR? 
What is the appropriate 
protection? 
Name Yes. Yes. Encryption. 
Age Yes. Yes. Encryption. 
Address Yes. Yes. Encryption. 
Gender Yes. Yes. Encryption. 
Identification Number Yes. Yes. Encryption. 
Email Yes. Yes. Encryption. 
Phone Number Yes. Yes. Encryption. 
Birthdate Yes. Yes. Encryption. 
Table 3.8 - Data types analysis according to GDPR 
All of the above types of data can be processed according to GDPR, since none of them are included on 
the “special categories of data” that were shown on GDPR’s article 9, “Processing of special categories 
of personal data” (General Data Protection Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, n.d.), from section 
2.1.2. Therefore, all of them can be simply pseudonymized according to the regulation. 
3.2.2 Data quantity 
Currently, the OI application receives approximately 24GB per day which translates to more or less 50 
million events, meaning an average of 515,38 bytes per event. 
3.3 Scenarios 
Having in mind the analysis of the different types of personal data that were identified for this thesis, 
the following data security scenarios must be considered: 
1. Data is so sensitive that it must not be processed or stored at all. 
a. At the moment there is no such data in the application at hand, but it might be in the 
future. So, for the purposes of this thesis, this scenario was also analysed. 
2. Data is sensitive, but part of it might be used to infer some conclusions. 
a. Eg.: phone number prefix to infer the country. 
3. Data is somewhat sensitive but it might be processed for well identified purposes 
a. Eg.: age. 
4. Customer doesn’t want any data to be processed, in which case everything should be discarded. 
5. Customer is ok with the processing of any kind of personal data, in which case even data from 
the scenario 1 may be stored. 
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3.4 Requirements 
The performance, security, usability and complexity requirements for each one of the above scenarios 
are here introduced. Access control requirements are also introduced here, but they’re on applied to 
situations where users need to perform actions or execute commands to obtain the original form of the 
data or situations where data can be accessed on different formats on different places. 
3.4.1 Performance 
Requirement # Description 
P1 Data should be processed at a rate of 10MB/s or more on a regular testing 
environment (eg.: common desktop). This should be translated to roughly 
300 events/s or 25 million events/day. 
P2 In case the personal data is much slower, it should not affect the processing 
of the remaining data. 
P3 In order to not separate the processing of personal data from the processing 
of regular data, the former should take a maximum of 5% more than the 
latter. 
Table 3.9 - Performance requirements 
3.4.2 Security 
Scenario Data protection Can it be viewed 
and/or 
processed? 
Where to protect the data? 
1. Data is so sensitive 
that it must not be 
processed or stored at 
all. 
Anonymization. This 
method corrupts the data 
entirely on the application. 
Neither. Indexer (Splunk side) 
- Anonymization  
Probe 
- Deny data forwarding for 
this specific type of data. 
2. Data is sensitive but 
part of it might be used 
to infer some 
conclusions. 
Format preserving 
Pseudonymization or a 
combination of encryption 
with anonymization, 
leaving part of data 
available for 
interpretation.  
Partially to both.    Indexer (Splunk side) 
Search time (Splunk side. Requires 
a more strict access control policy to 
the server machine). 
3. Data is somewhat 
sensitive but it might be 
processed for well 
identified purposes. 
 
Encryption. Data should 
be protected, but it might 
be viewed in clear if 
needed. 
Yes to both. Indexer (Splunk side) 
Search time (Splunk side. Requires 
a more strict access control policy to 
the server machine). 
4. Customer doesn’t 
want any data to be 
processed, in which 
case everything should 
be discarded. 
 
Anonymization. This 
method corrupts the data 
entirely on the application. 
Neither. Indexer (Splunk side) 
- Anonymization  
Probe 
- Deny any data forwarding. 
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5. Customer is ok with 
the processing of any 
kind of personal data, in 
which case even data 
from the scenario 1 may 
be stored. 
Encryption. Data should 
be protected, but it might 
be viewed in clear if 
needed. 
Yes to both. Indexer (Splunk side) 
Search time (Splunk side. Requires 
a more strict access control policy to 
the server machine). 
Table 3.10 - Security scenarios to consider in the requirements 
Based on the above information, the following requirements can be gathered: 
Requirement # Description 
S1 Data that falls under a “special category of data” should preferably not be forward 
to the OI application for processing. 
S2 Data that doesn’t fall under a special category of data and is only partially 
processed should be partially anonymized, unless a future scenario where this 
portion of data is needed is well identified. The non-anonymized portion of the 
data should be pseudonymized. 
S3 Data that is processed in its entirety and doesn’t fall under a special category of 
data, should be pseudonymized. 
S4 If the customer that owns the data wishes that his personal data is not processed, 
all data should be immediately anonymized on the OI application. No further data 
should be forwarded by the probe regarding this customer. 
S5 If the customer that owns the data wishes that his personal data is processed, all 
personal data should be pseudonymized.  
S6 Both Encryptions and Anonymizations should be performed as soon as possible 
on the data pipeline, making full use of what the current state of art allows. 
Table 3.11 - Security requirements 
3.4.3 Usability 
The following requirements can be gathered regarding the solution’s usability: 
Requirement # Description 
U1 The solution should be scalable 
U2 Data should be usable after being protected. 
Table 3.12 - Usability requirements 
3.4.4 Complexity 
The following requirements can be gathered regarding the solution’s complexity: 
Requirement # Description 
C1 The solution should be easily installed on clients. 
Table 3.13 - Complexity requirements 
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3.4.5 Control Access 
As was introduced on section 2.5.4 regarding access control on Splunk, Splunk comes with the 
administrator, power-user and user roles. Having in mind that only operations that are specifically 
executed by users at search time should be controlled, the following requirements can be specified: 
Requirement # Description 
CA1 Only administrators should be able to execute commands that decrypt data. 
CA2 All users should be able to encrypt data at search time, to protect it in the 
scope of an application if needed. 
Table 3.14 - Control access requirements 
3.5 Summary 
The current OI solution focuses on the study of middleware environments like Enterprise Application 
Integration (EAI), Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) and Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), giving 
insights into performance, reliability, volume and concurrency metrics. This OI solution is implemented 
with Splunk, having its usual architecture, and has a probe that collects all the needed data on the targeted 
environments. Aside from the architecture, this section identified the involved subjects, common use 
cases and the operations, having in mind the criticality of all of them in security terms. 
Different types of personal data that might show up on the OI application were identified here, along 
with multiple scenarios of data sensibility and customer will to have them being processed. Having this 
information in mind, performance, security, usability and complexity requirements were established for 
the prototypes that are proposed on section 4.   
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4 Protecting OI personal data 
This section establishes a business scenario that is based on the personal data types that are expected to 
be received on the studied OI application. Since no personal data is currently being collected on the real 
OI application, a probe simulator was developed in order to send customer data to Splunk’s Forwarder. 
This probe is introduced on section 4.1.2. 
Different data protection mechanisms and architectures were tested having in mind the aforementioned 
business scenario, along with their pros and cons in terms of usability, performance, security and 
complexity. 
4.1 Business scenario 
The Business Scenario is heavily influenced by a real world OI application, also based in Splunk. This 
application collects both incoming and outgoing data on an Enterprise Service Bus (ESB), giving a good 
insight in the form of real time analytics into the data that is received from client systems, sent to the 
backend resources and into the data that the ESB itself generates. 
For the purposes of this thesis, a simulation of the data was done instead of using the real one, since 
there is currently no personal data on the OI application. This also prevents any corruption of the real 
data that is already being used by instances of this product. 
4.1.1 Simulated entities 
The scenario for the presented prototypes is a telecommunications company. This company sells 
subscriptions that can have different price plans, products like phones, sim cards, and so on. 
The existing entities can be found on Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1 - Entity diagram of the prototypes' simulated data 
The actual orders are as simple as it gets as the main purpose of this model is to have clients with realistic 
personal data that, in a common scenario, would be found on Splunk logs. 
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4.1.2 Splunk Probe simulator 
This probe is implemented in Java and is merely a library to generate random customer data. All data is 
exported to a log file that is then read by the Splunk forwarder.  
The generated customer data has the following format: 
“<TIMESTAMP>,<GLOBAL_ID>,<CRM_ORDER_ID>,<CRM_ORDER_VERSION>,<ADDRESS>
,<IDENTIFICATION_NUMBER>,<EMAIL>,<PHONE_NUMBER>,<CUSTOMER_NAME>,<CUS
TOMER_FIRSTNAME>,<CUSTOMER_LASTNAME>,<CUSTOMER_TYPE>,<BIRTHDATE>,<GE
NDER>,<OPERATION_TYPE>,<OPERATION_SUB_TYPE>,<PRODUCT_TYPE>,<PRODUCT_I
NSTANCE_ID>,<PRODUCT_SPEC_ID>” 
The above format represents a single element of a customer order, which means that, most of the times, 
there is more than one line for each global id, customer id and client info (name, email, etc.), which is 
to be expected in most big data scenarios.  
4.2 Prototypes 
The following four prototypes were tested: 
1. Prototype 1: Using built-in anonymization methods to protect the data. 
2. Prototype 2: Using 2 separate indexes on Splunk, one with protected data and another with data 
in clear text. 
3. Prototype 3: Using a Python library for the Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme. 
4. Prototype 4: Using Microsoft’s SEAL library for fully homomorphic encryption. 
4.2.1 Prototype 1 - Anonymization 
On this prototype, the data was here protected once it reaches the Splunk indexer through the use of 
anonymization techniques. 
a. Prototype architecture 
This prototype follows a standard Splunk architecture, where we have a Splunk forwarder, a Splunk 
Indexer and a Splunk Search head, like shown on Figure 4.2: 
• Splunk forwarder – where the data originates from in clear text. 
• Splunk indexer – where the data is stored and where the data is protected. 
• Splunk search head – where the data is read by end users. 
The data is generated randomly by the Probe simulator that was mentioned on section 4.1.2. 
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Figure 4.2 - Anonymization prototype architecture 
b. Data protection 
The data is protected at “index-time” by using regex commands (see Annex A) to identify personal data 
and replacing the results with non-sense values. This method is called “Regex Replace” and was already 
introduced on section 2.5.3.  
The Regex Replace method implements data anonymization, thus making the data not reversable. Figure 
4.3 shows an example of the logs that Splunk shows after the fields are protected: 
 
Figure 4.3 - Anonymization data protection 
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c. Access control 
This solution doesn’t need any kind of access control to personal data, since the data is already protected 
in such a way that making it able to seen or not to certain users doesn’t make any difference. 
d. Prototype analysis 
This prototype was here analysed regarding performance, security, usability and complexity.  
Being a regex replace based prototype, it is expected that it shares similar characteristics to ones shown 
by the “Regex replace” option of section 2.5.3. It has indeed high security, acceptable performance and 
low complexity as good characteristics, while having low usability as a bad characteristic. These are 
analysed in more detail in the following sections. 
i. Performance 
In terms of performance, this solution is as best as it can get when it comes to field protection on the 
Splunk data layer. There is no computation involved in the field protection other than finding the field’s 
value and replacing it some value. 
The part of the latency that results from data forwarding can be ignored on this prototype, since no 
computation is performed on the data before reaching the Splunk indexer. Only the difference between 
the first and last event index time needs to be considered here.  
3 load tests were performed with this solution: 
Test # Number of customer order 
(distinct global ids) 
Number of events Total index time 
(secs) 
Avg. time per 
event (secs) 
1 1000 11058 76 0,00687 
2 5000 49969 106 0,00212 
3 10000 101329 218 0,00215 
Table 4.1 - Anonymization's performance metrics 
ii. Security 
In terms of security, this solution is also the best that can be achieved. There is no way of recovering the 
personal data since, in practice, the data is being destroyed. 
iii. Usability 
In terms of usability, this solution as bad as it gets. It is impossible to use the personal data in any way 
since, again, the data was essentially destroyed.  
The data is only slightly usable, without jeopardizing the security, if some part of it is left in the original 
form. Some examples are: 
• One can leave just the phone number prefix in clear in order to conclude to which country the 
phone number belongs. 
• One can anonymize the phone number of a client but leave the number of digit evident (eg.: if 
the phone number is replaced by 9 digits with no meaning, one could conclude that this number 
is from Portugal if that’s the only country with 9 digits on the company). 
Both methods were used on the protype at the same time, as can be seen on Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4 - Anonymization prototype's usability 
iv. Complexity 
This solution is based on building appropriate regex commands and typing a meaningless string to 
replace the resulting value, which can be considered as simple. A way of deploying along with the 
solution to a client would be to have a simple configuration file containing the regular expressions, 
which is already provided by Splunk.  
e. GDPR analysis 
There are two situations to be considered when analysing whether or not this solution is compliant with 
GDPR, namely the following two articles: 
• Article 17 – Right to be forgotten – It’s here mentioned that any data subject can have all data 
concerning him erased without any delay (General Data Protection Regulation - Final text neatly 
arranged, n.d.). 
• Article 32 – Security of processing – It’s here mentioned that all stored personal data should 
be protected according to its level of risk and its integrity, among other security principles, 
should be enforced (General Data Protection Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, n.d.). 
Article 17 shows a good scenario where this solution can be applied. Just as was introduced on the 
security requirements, namely requirement S4, the data subject can ask for all his/her data to be removed 
or destroyed, and this can be easily achieved with anonymization. 
Article 32 shows the opposite. If the anonymization is used solely as a mean to protect a specific portion 
of data, that same portion of data will have its integrity compromised, thus compromising the following 
rights of the data subject as well: 
• Right of access (article 15), which states that the data subject should be able to access his or 
her personal data (General Data Protection Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, n.d.); 
• Right to rectification (article 16), which states that the data subject should be able to rectify 
his or her personal data (General Data Protection Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, n.d.); 
• Right to data portability (article 20), which states that the data subject should be able to 
receive the personal data concerning him or her in a structured format (General Data Protection 
Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, n.d.). 
If the data is destroyed with anonymization, the user will not be able to access it, rectify it (since the 
data is not understandable) or received it in a structured format. On might add that destroyed data might 
mean that the user has no data concerning him or her in the first place, but with operational intelligence 
solutions this data is originated from a lot of systems meaning that it is through these solutions that the 
data is obtained most of the time. 
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f. Prototype conclusion 
This prototype has very clear performance, complexity and security advantages since, due to the low 
load that is induced on the solution to protect the data, the protection of data is very efficient, very fast 
and easy to implement. 
Nevertheless, all the good things about this prototype are masked by its complete lack of usability. 
Replacing data by meaningless values is pretty much the same as destroying the data which, in term, is 
the same as not having it at all. The whole point of protecting personal data instead of deleting it right 
away is to allow an analysis to be performed upon that data latter. 
This prototype is not advisable in a context where there is no way of cross-referencing the anonymized 
data via non-anonymized fields. 
Finally, this solution should never be used as a means to protect personal data that the user didn’t ask to 
be forgotten. If the data exists, which happens on a lot of the systems that are monitored with operational 
intelligence, it should be easily obtained, normally via the OI solution itself. The only scenario where 
this solution should be used is when the data subject actually invokes his right to be forgotten. 
Section 4.2.2 introduces an alternative mechanism called AES, which stands for Advanced Encryption 
Standard. AES offers a better way of protecting data for scenarios where the user didn’t ask to be 
forgotten, like said above. 
4.2.2 Prototype 2 – AES 
On this prototype, the data was protected with the AES encryption scheme on one of two places: 
• On an external processor, before reaching the indexer – This approach requires an additional 
server to be installed/deployed but ensures that the data is stored already on a protected state. 
• At search time – This approach doesn’t need an additional server to be installed/deployed but 
leaves the data on an unprotected state. 
Both approaches are not perfect as was explained above. The reason why an approach that protects data 
at index time wasn’t adopted is that there is no such approach on Splunk’s current state of art.  
After the encryption is performed, the data is only visible on clear text by users with enough permissions 
that allow them to execute the appropriate decryption command on Splunk. Both decryption and 
encryption commands were implemented in Python as part of this prototype. In this case, users with 
higher permissions (eg.: administrators) are able to decrypt the data while users with lower permissions 
(eg.: developers or users) are only able to encrypt the data if needed. 
a. Prototype architecture 
As was already said, this prototype may follow one of the architectures that are shown on Figures 4.5 
and 4.6: 
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i. External processor 
 
Figure 4.5 - AES prototype's external processor architecture 
ii. Search time 
 
Figure 4.6 - AES prototype's search time architecture 
b. Data protection 
The data can be protected on an external processor or at search time. For the purposes of this prototype, 
the AES algorithm was applied to all available personal data, in order to get the full impact of this 
solution.  
Figure 4.7 shows an event with data that was already protected with AES: 
   
 
42 
 
 
Figure 4.7 - Data protection of the Paillier prototype 
These same fields can later on be decrypted by users with enough permissions with python commands 
on the Splunk side.  
For this purpose, a command called “decryptaes” was created. This command receives field names as 
arguments and decrypts them using a secret key that is shared between the indexer and the external 
processor. 
As said before, the data can also be encrypted at search time. For this purpose, a “encryptaes” command 
was also created. The result of this command is exactly the same that is shown on Figure 4.7. 
As an example, let’s take the “BirthDate” field: 
 
Figure 4.8 – Field encryption of AES 
As can be seen on Figure 4.8, the field contains an already encrypted value. Figure 4.9 shows the 
application of the “decryptaes” command into the encrypted value using the Administrator account: 
   
 
43 
 
 
Figure 4.9 – Field decryption of AES 
c. Access control 
This prototype follows a simple Role-Based Access Control (RoBAC) where users with different levels 
of privileges are able to see different types of data, reports, dashboards and so on. In this matter, users 
can be split into 2 categories on this prototype: 
• Users that can see personal data via searches that make use of a decryption command. 
• Users that can only see the protected version of the customer data via searches that make use 
of an encryption command. 
The way these generic users types are fit into the subject types that were introduced on section 3.1.1 is 
explained below. 
i. Client-side subjects 
Only the following client-side subjects should be able to execute the decryption command to see 
personal data in clear-text: 
Subject Examples of personal data usage 
Application Maintenance (AM) + 
Service Manager (SM) 
Root-cause analysis for eventual corrupted data, like 
unexpected values for certain users for example. 
Security specialists This subject is responsible for ensuring the security of the 
application, hence, it’s also his/her responsibility to 
understand if personal data is corrupted for example. 
Administrators Last resort user. 
Table 4.2 - AES's client-side access control 
As can be seen of the following section, the main difference between client-side subjects and internal 
users is that developers are not allowed to see personal data in clear-text. That responsibility should be 
passed to the internal users or, in a more critical situation, to security specialists. 
ii. Internal users 
All internal users but System Administrators should have access to the decryption command in order to 
implement/manage the OI solution properly. The following examples showcase what each user should 
be able to do with personal data: 
Subject Examples of personal data usage 
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Developers Implementation of dashboards that analyse personal data like 
to conclude: 
- average of age 
- most popular gender for each product type 
- … 
System Administrators N/A. 
Administrators Analyse available personal data against the current situation 
of the company in order to specify requirements for the 
Developers. 
Table 4.3 - AES's internal user access control 
d. Prototype analysis 
This prototype is here analysed regarding performance, security, usability and complexity. 
From the field protection options that were introduced on section 2.5.3, the “External Processor” and 
“Search time” approaches were tested on this prototype. The “Modular input” and “Scheduled search” 
approaches could’ve also been tested, but the principle of executing an additional python script would 
be the same, thus inducing the same kind of overhead. The “Result Masking” would’ve not protected 
the actual data that is stored on the indexer, since the protection is applied only at search time on this 
approach. 
i. Performance 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the following performance information: 
• Both encryption start and end timestamps were sent to the Splunk indexer along with the already 
protected data. 
• 3 tests were performed: 
o Test 1 – 1000 customer orders 
o Test 2 – 5000 customer orders 
o Test 3 – 10000 customer orders 
The performance of AES using the “External Processor” approach is shown on Table 4.10. 
Test 
# 
Number of 
customer order 
(distinct global 
ids) 
Number of 
events 
Bytes Total 
encryption 
time (secs) 
Avg. time 
per event 
(secs) 
Avg. 
time per 
MB 
(secs) 
1 1000 9987 5 889 478 322,71 0,032 0.0548 
2 5000 50120 26 943 556 1476,36 0,029 0.0548 
3 10000 100927 56 886 143 3270,81 0.032 0.0575 
Table 4.4 - AES performance metrics – External processor approach 
The performance of AES using the “Search time” approach is shown on Table 4.11. 
Test 
# 
Number of 
customer order 
(distinct global 
ids) 
Number of 
events 
Bytes Total 
encryption 
time (secs) 
Avg. time 
per event 
(secs) 
Avg. 
time per 
MB 
(secs) 
1 1000 9899 6 463 408 354,16 0.035 0.0548 
2 5000 50345 32 831 826 1798,45 0.036 0.0548 
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3 10000 100521 65 698 287 3600,36 0.036 0.0548 
Table 4.5 - AES performance metrics – Search time approach 
As is shown on Table 4.10, this prototype loses pretty much a decimal value in comparison with the 
anonymization prototype. Nevertheless, it still encrypts all personal data of a single event in 
approximately 0,03 seconds and encrypts 1 MB in approximately 0.05 secs. 
Taking into account the personal data estimate of 1% that was established on section 3.1.4 and 
considering that approximately 24GBs of data (~50 million events) are received every day, the OI 
application is expected to receive 240MBs of personal data per day. 
In conclusion, 12 seconds would be needed to encrypt all personal data of a single day, which is more 
than acceptable.  
ii. Security 
Of the two provided architectures, the External Processor is the best one in terms of security, since it 
protects all personal data before it reaches the Splunk solution environment. Data can then be seen in its 
clear text format only by users with high enough privileges on the access control rules, which in this 
case are the Administrators. This solution meets security requirements 3, 5 and 6 and also partially meets 
requirement 2, which is a mixture of this solution and the anonymization one (see section 4.2.1). 
On the other hand, the “Search Time” solution protects the search tier only and leaves the data stored in 
the indexer on an unprotected format. This solution also meets requirements 2 (partially), 3, 4 and 5, but 
requires that the server should only be accessed locally by users with high privileges (administrators and 
system administrators). The usability problems that originate from this approach are explained on the 
Usability section.     
iii. Usability 
Both “External Processor” and “Search time” have the same problem of usability in the sense that data 
can no longer be processed once it is encrypted, unless an user with high enough privileges comes into 
the picture. The only data processing that normal users (eg.: developers) can perform are string 
concatenations, and even that operations requires full documentation of the type of data and approval 
from the administrators to ensure that there is no corruption and that the data is on the intended format. 
On top of this, the “Search Time” approach also requires that no users other than Administrators and 
System Administrators can access the server locally, due to the data being stored on clear text, which is 
historically difficult to implement. 
Both solutions meet requirements U1 and U2, even though only partially. According to U1, the solution 
should be scalable, which forces roles to be well defined onto each users that joins the application. 
According to U2, data should be usable, which is fully met for Administrator users only.  
iv. Complexity 
The “External processor” approach has the problem of requiring an additional server, which will 
probably not be attractive to a client.  
Also, it requires additional decryption commands to be deployed with the application as well, being that 
the decryption must have an enforced strict access control. This command also needs a secret key to be 
shared between the external processor server and the indexer server, which in itself already requires 
constant maintenance. Maintaining this same secret key on clustered environments exponentiates the 
complexity of the solution even more. 
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The “Search time” approach avoids the problem of shared keys between servers, which makes it less 
complex, and avoids the problem of having an additional server. Nevertheless, it has the same problem 
of access control for the encryption and decryption commands. 
e. GDPR analysis 
The “External processor” approach complies with everything that is stated on GDPR. All personal data 
is protected with the use of encryption - like said on GDPR’s article 25 “Data protection by default ad 
by design (General Data Protection Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, n.d.), of section 2.1.4 - 
before it is stored on the indexer machine. 
As for the “Search Time” approach the same cannot be said. The data is left on a clear text format on 
the indexer, meaning that anyone with enough privileges can access the server locally and access the 
data on its original format. This breaks the same article 25 that was mentioned above. 
Both approaches maintain the integrity of the data - like said on GDPR’s article 5 (General Data 
Protection Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, n.d.), “Processing of personal data”, of section 2.1.2 
- since a user with enough privileges can still use a decryption command to see data in its original form. 
The only kind of data processing that can be done is to concatenate strings at search time, which still 
doesn’t affect the actual data that is stored on the indexer anyway. 
f. Prototype conclusion 
This prototype uses a symmetric encryption scheme named AES that pseudonymizes the data. This 
prototype may be implemented with the help of an “External Processor” server that protects the data 
before it reaches the indexer or with encryption commands that are executed at search time.  
None of the approaches is perfect, being that the External Processor is weak in usability and complexity 
but strong on security and fully compliant with GDPR and the approach at Search time is strong in 
complexity, less weak in usability but with discussable compliance with GDPR. 
Both approaches may be used depending on the scenario at hand. A client with fewer resources and 
capacity but strict when it comes to security might be more keen on using a Search time approach, while 
a client who is able to spend more resources on a single solution might choose the External Processor 
approach and allocate more people into the project to properly maintain the solution. 
In terms of performance, this solution is not as good as the Anonymization one but it is still more than 
acceptable, offering encryption of data equivalent to one day in approximately 12 seconds. Like is shown 
on sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, it surpasses by far both Paillier and SEAL, respectively. 
Like was mentioned above, sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 put into the test Paillier and SEAL, which are 
homomorphic encryption mechanisms. This type of encryption allows the data to be processed with a 
set of operations even when this same data is already encrypted, thus offering a good solution to the 
usability problem of AES. 
4.2.3 Prototype 3 – Paillier 
The Paillier library is implemented in Python. As was shown in the Paillier dedicated part of section 
2.3.3, the homomorphic property of this scheme is: 
ℇ(x1).ℇ(x2) = (𝑔𝑥1  𝑟1
𝑚) (𝑔𝑥2  𝑟2
𝑚) mod 𝑚2 = 𝑔𝑥1+𝑥2 (𝑟1𝑟2)
𝑚 mod 𝑚2 = ℇ(x1 + x2) 
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In practice, this means that Paillier is well suited for add and multiply operations. Being Splunk and, 
more generically, operational intelligence areas that deal with alphanumerical data, this algorithm is not 
enough as is, since it works only for numeric values. 
Nevertheless, it can be adapted to work with strings as well by converting them to Unicode and 
performing the operations on that value. For the purposes of this document, only the concatenation 
operation was implemented to test this scheme on a close to real environment. 
a. Prototype architecture 
This prototype follows an architecture with an external processor located between the Splunk forwarder 
and the Splunk Indexer. This external processor is where the Paillier algorithm is executed to protect the 
sensitive personal data before it reaches the Splunk indexer. 
Figure 4.10 illustrates the architecture described above. 
 
Figure 4.10 - Paillier prototype architecture 
b. Concatenation adaptation 
Paillier is, like most homomorphic encryption schemes, an algorithm that allows processing of numeric 
data only. Nevertheless, the studied OI solution has mostly alpha-numeric values. 
For the purposes of this thesis, this algorithm was adapted to allow string concatenations which is one 
of the most common operations and also the easiest to implement. The purpose of using concatenations 
is to showcase the potential for evolution in homomorphic encryption.  
In order to adapt the Paillier algorithm to String concatenations, the following logic was implemented 
for encryptions: 
1. Both strings s1 and s2 are converted to Unicode. 
2. Both unicodes U(s1) and U(s2) are encrypted using the encryption code that is provided by the 
Paillier library. 
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3. The encrypted unicodes E(U(s1)) and E(U(s2)) are concatenated with a secret split character 
between them. 
 For decryptions: 
1. The encrypted data E(U(s1)) ⊕ E(U(s2)) is split by the secret split character that was previously 
defined, originating two different encrypted strings E(U(s1)) and E(U(s2)). 
2. Both encrypted strings are decrypted originating the original Unicode values U(s1) and U(s2) 
3. The Unicode values are concatenated back originating U(s1⊕ s2) 
4. The Unicode value U(s1⊕ s2) is converted back to String originating s1⊕ s2. 
The whole idea behind this algorithm is quite simple and it relies solely on the split character, which 
must be safe. In order to ensure its safety, it should be encrypted as well and should remain a secret to 
the application, in the same way as a secret key. 
i. Code 
In order to verify the above logic, 2 Python classes were created: 
• StringPaillier.py – This class implements all the needed methods to convert String to Unicode, 
convert Unicode to String, concatenate encrypted strings and decrypt concatenated strings. 
• Test.py – This is the main class. It asks the user for 2 strings that he wishes to concatenate, 
encrypts both strings, uses the secret split character to concatenate them and finally reverts the 
encryption. All this is done with the methods from the StringPaillier class and the results are 
shown on the terminal. 
The actual code for the above files can be found on Appendix A. 
ii. Execution 
In the following scenario, the user chose strings “Andre “ and “Lourenco” and, as can be seen on yellow, 
the result is the expected one, i.e. “Andre Lourenco”. Please note that the encrypted values on Figure 
4.11 are not shown on its entirety, since they were to big to fit in the screen. 
 
Figure 4.11 - Execution of the Paillier concatenation adaptation 
It’s also worth noting that the encryption took close to 5 seconds per each String. Table 4.6 shows the 
execution time for 7 different string concatenations. 
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String 1 String 2 Encryption 
time 
(string 1) 
Encryption 
time 
(string 2) 
“Andre “ “Lourenco” 5,260 secs 5,074 secs 
“Cristiano “ “Ronaldo” 5,012 secs 4,460 secs 
“AaBbCcDdEeFfGgHh” “IiJjKkLlMmNnOoPp” 4,865 secs 5,176 secs 
“qwertyQWERTYqwerty” “QWERTYqwertyQWERTYqwerty” 5,090 secs 4,959 secs 
“Hello “ “World” 4,774 secs 4,631 secs 
“221B Baker Street“ “, London, England” 4,872 secs 5,410 secs 
“abdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz” “ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP 
QRSTUVWXYZ” 
4,738 secs 5,146 secs 
Table 4.6 - Paillier's concatenation adaptation execution times 
This is not ideal on Operational Intelligence solutions, where it is expected that dozens of gigabytes are 
received per day. 
c. Data protection 
The data is protected on an external processor, before reaching Splunk territory. For the purposes of this 
prototype, all personal data was protected with the Paillier algorithm, in order to get the full impact of 
this solution. The result of this protection is shown on Figure 4.12. 
 
Figure 4.12 - Data protection of the Paillier prototype 
This same fields can later on be decrypted by users with enough permissions with python commands on 
the Splunk side.  
For this purpose, a command called “decryptpaillier” was created. This command receives field names 
as arguments and decrypts them using the public and private keys from the Paillier algorithm that are 
shared between the indexer and the external processor. 
As an example, let’s take the “BirthDate” field: 
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Figure 4.13 - Paillier's field encryption 
As can be seen on Figure 4.13, the field contains an already encrypted value. Figure 4.14 shows the 
application of the “decryptpaillier” command to the encrypted value using the Administrator account: 
 
Figure 4.14 - Paillier's field decryption 
d. Access control 
A Role-Based Access Control policy was applied to the decryption command that was implemented on 
Splunk. The command was configured to be readable by the admin user role only. The admin role here 
is equivalent to the “Administrator” role that was introduced on the Internal users of section 3.1.1. 
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The decryption was already shown on the previous section. Nevertheless, if a user outside the admin 
role were to try to use this command, Splunk acts as is the command doesn’t exist at all, like shown on 
Figure 4.15. 
 
Figure 4.15 - Paillier's access control 
e. Prototype analysis 
This prototype is here analysed regarding performance, security, usability and complexity. 
From the options that were introduced on section 2.5.3 for data obfuscation and field protection, the 
“External Processor approach is tested on this prototype. The “Modular input” and “Scheduled search” 
approaches could’ve also been tested, but the principle of executing an additional python script would 
be the same, thus inducing the same kind of overhead. The “Result Masking” would’ve not protected 
the actual data that is stored on the indexer, since the protection is applied only at search time on this 
approach. 
i. Performance 
As was already shown on the “Concatenation adaptation” section of this prototype, data 
encryption/decryption takes too much time for an Operational Intelligence solution. It takes 
approximately 5 seconds to encrypt 1 single string, with the increased handicap that this approach 
requires an additional machine to communicate with. 
Table 4.7 proves the above statement with the following information:  
• Both encryption start and end timestamps were sent to the Splunk indexer along with the already 
protected data. 
• 3 tests were performed: 
o Test 1 – 1 customer order 
o Test 2 – 3 customer orders 
o Test 3 – 5 customer orders 
Test 
# 
Number of 
customer order 
(distinct global 
ids) 
Number of 
events 
Size 
(bytes) 
Total 
encryption 
time (secs) 
Avg. time 
per event 
(secs) 
Avg. 
time per 
MB 
(secs) 
1 1 19 10608 1038.308 54.647 97,88 
2 3 29 16248 1486.541 51.260 91,49 
3 5 60 31567 3669.511 61.158 116,25 
Table 4.7 - Paillier's performance metrics 
As expected, Paillier’s performance is completely unacceptable. It takes approximately 55 seconds to 
protect one single event with 8 personal data fields and approximately 100 seconds to protect 1MB. This 
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makes the implementation of this solution impracticable in a scenario where approximately 24GBs of 
data or 50 million events are received each day.  
Even with the estimates of having 1% of the whole data being personal (as established on section 3.1.4), 
this leaves approximately 240MBs that need to be protected, which translates to 24000 seconds or 6,6 
hours of data protection. 
ii. Security 
This solution can be applied on scenario 2 with combined encryption and anonymization, scenario 3 
with pure encryption for specific data and scenario 5 with pure encryption for all data. 
This solution is pretty good security wise, in the sense that the protected data (or portion of data) cannot 
be interpreted by the human eye without being decrypted, just like any normal encryption scenario. 
iii. Usability 
Even though the data is pseudonymized, it can still be processed for certain operations. Nevertheless, 
the amount of work that can be done on the data without jeopardizing its integrity is quite limited. 
In conclusion, the solution is a bit better than normal encryption, but not much. 
iv. Complexity 
The complexity of this solution is quite high in terms of client deploys. Since only a very limited set of 
operations can be performed on the data after encryption, a clear decision must be made as to which 
data can be protected with this method, i.e. which data will only need that set of operations and nothing 
more. 
This solution also involves setting up a separate server that works as an external processor, which might 
not be attractive to a client.  
The external processor protects the data, but that same data is only processed on the Splunk side, 
meaning that new Splunk commands need to be implemented to concatenate strings and perform 
mathematical operations at search time.  
Finally, if needed, a command will also be used to decrypt the data for users with higher privileges, in 
which case public keys will need to be shared between all the involved servers. Maintaining public and 
private keys on clustered environments exponentiates the complexity of the solution even more. 
f. GDPR analysis 
Regarding GDPR, this prototype complies with everything that is stated in the regulation. All personal 
data is protected with the use of encryption - like said on GDPR’s article 25 (General Data Protection 
Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, n.d.), “Data protection by default and by design”, of section 
2.1.4 - before it is stored on the indexer machine.  
Also, the integrity of the data is maintained - like said on GDPR’s article 5 (General Data Protection 
Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, n.d.), “Processing of personal data”, shown on section 2.1.2 - 
since a user with enough privileges can still use a decryption command to see data in its original form. 
The only kind of data processing that can be done is to concatenate strings at search time and mathematic 
operations, which will still not affect the actual data that is stored on the indexer anyway. 
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g. Prototype conclusion 
While being fully compliant with GDPR, this prototype offers the possibility to still perform some 
operations on the personal data, which is essential for the solution at hand. 
Nevertheless, the really poor performance of this prototype completely throws it down the drain due to 
being impractical in an operation intelligence environment where scalability of data is to be expected. 
Having this in mind, the 6,6 hours of personal data protection by day can quickly grow to half a day or, 
in more extreme situations, to even more than a day, creating a bottleneck to all processes that surround 
this single operation. 
Section 4.2.4 introduces SEAL which, similarly to Paillier, is a homomorphic encryption mechanism. 
Being a solution that was implemented by a team of developers from Microsoft, SEAL is expected to 
perform much better than Paillier both in performance and in the number of operations upon encrypted 
data that it provides. 
4.2.4 Prototype 4 – SEAL library 
The Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library (SEAL) is a C++ homomorphic encryption library that was 
developed at Microsoft Research by a group of researchers in the Cryptography Research Group (Laine, 
2017). 
a. SEAL introduction 
The SEAL’s purpose is to be easy to use by both experts and non-experts of the homomorphic encryption 
field, by being as well-engineered and documented as possible. 
The two basic homomorphic operations are additions and multiplications, of which additions can 
generally be thought of as being nearly free in terms of noise budget consumption compared to 
multiplications. 
The SEAL algorithm requires 4 encryption parameters in order to be properly set: 
• poly_modulus – a polynomial 𝑥𝑛 + 1, where n is a power of 2; 
• coeff_modulus - an integer modulus q which is constructed as a product of multiple distinct 
primes; 
• plain_modulus – an integer modulus t; 
• noise_standard_deviation – a standard deviation σ, which is assigned a standard value of 3,19; 
SEAL cannot perform arbitrary computations on encrypted data because data becomes too corrupted to 
be decrypted after a certain number of operations is performed. This is determined by a specific quantity 
named “invariant noise budget” measured in bits. This noise budget and the rate at which it is consumed 
is determined by the above encryption parameters. Decryption becomes impossible when the noise 
budget reaches zero. 
A simple life cycle of operations on the data is as follows: 
1. Define the encryption parameters. 
2. Construct a SEAL context object, which checks the validity and properties of the parameters 
that were just set. 
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3. Define an encoding scheme to represent the values to encrypt as polynomials. The values can 
be encoded with an IntegerEncoder, FractionalEncoder or PolyCRTBuilder. For the purposes 
of this thesis, only the first two are considered. 
4. Generate the public and secret keys with a built-in key generator. 
5. Define an encryptor object with the context and the public key.  
6. Define a decryptor object with the context and secret key. 
7. Encode the involved values with the defined built-in encoding scheme. 
8. Encrypt the encoded values. 
9. Perform the needed operations with built-in methods. 
10. Calculate the noise budget of the encrypted data. 
11. Decrypt the resulting data if the noise budget is still bigger than zero bits. 
IntegerEncoder 
A base-b expansion of the integer is computed, which uses a balanced set of representatives of integers 
modulo b as the coefficients.When b is odd the coefficients are integers between –(b-1)/2 and (b-1)/2. 
When b is even, the integers are between -b/2 and (b-1)/2, except when b is two and the usual binary 
expansion is used (coefficients 0 and 1). 
Example with b=2:  
26 = 24 + 23 +  21 is encoded as the polynomial 1𝑥4 + 1𝑥3 +  1𝑥1. 
Example with b=3: 
26 = 33 − 30 is encoded as the polynomial 1𝑥3 − 1 
FractionalEncoder 
Encodes fixed-precision rational numbers. 
Expands the number in a given base b, possibly truncating an infinite fractional part to finite precision. 
Example with b=2: 
26.75 = 24 + 23 + 21 + 2−1 + 2−2 is encoded as -1𝑥1023 - 1𝑥1022 + 𝑥4+ 1𝑥3 + 1𝑥1. 
b. Prototype architecture 
Two architectures were considered for this prototype. 
First, an architecture with an external processor located between 2 Splunk forwarders, like shown on 
Figure 4.16. This external processor is where the SEAL algorithm is executed to protect the sensitive 
personal data before it reaches the Splunk indexer. The first forwarder sends the raw data to the external 
processor. The external processor then protects the data and stores it locally on a folder that is being 
monitored by another forwarder located on the same machine. 
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Figure 4.16 – SEAL’s prototype architecture 1 
Second, an architecture with an external processor located between the Splunk forwarder and the Splunk 
Indexer, like shown on Figure 4.17. This is better both performance and structure wise, since only 1 
forwarder machine is needed, thus reducing the overhead and the installation requirements. On the other 
hand, it is much more difficult to implement because Splunk doesn’t provide a communication API for 
C++. 
 
Figure 4.17 - SEAL’s prototype architecture 2 
c. Data protection 
The data is protected on an external processor, before reaching Splunk territory. For the purposes of this 
prototype, all personal data was protected with the SEAL algorithm, in order to get the full impact of 
this solution.  
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The following 2 types of protection were tested with SEAL: 
1. Encryption with integer encoding, along with appropriate mathematic operations. This type 
of encryption is used only on numeric fields, like “IdentificationNumber” for example; 
2. Encryption of strings, by converting the string to Unicode, similarly to what was done on the 
concatenation adaption for the Paillier algorithm (see section 4.2.3). 
Figure 4.18 shows an event with data that was already protected with SEAL. Due to the high complexity 
of the decrypted values that result from the SEAL algorithm, only the Address field was encrypted, in 
order to make the figure more visible. 
 
Figure 4.18 - SEAL's data protection 
All fields can later on be decrypted by users with enough permissions with python commands on the 
Splunk side that invoke the C++ executables via command line/terminal.  
For this purpose, a command called “decryptseal” was created. Similarly to the “decryptpaillier” 
command that was created for the Paillier prototype, this command receives field names as arguments 
and decrypts them using the public and private keys from the SEAL algorithm that are shared between 
the indexer and the external processor. 
Figure 4.18 already shows what it looks like to encrypt the Address field with SEAL. Figure 4.19 shows 
the application of the “decryptseal” command into the encrypted Address field using the Administrator 
account. 
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Figure 4.19 – SEAL field decryption 
i. Integer encoding 
The following course of action was taken for this scenario: 
1. Two numbers, 5 and -7, were chosen and encoded using an Integer encoder; 
2. The encoded values were encrypted; 
3. Encrypted 5 was negated using the “negate” built in method; 
4. The sum of the encrypted -5 with the encrypted -7 was calculated using the “add” built in 
method; 
5. The result of the sum was multiplied by the encrypted -7 using the “multiply” built in method; 
6. The final result was decrypted and then decoded with the Integer encoder;. 
It’s also worth noting that the invariant noise budget was calculated after each encryption step (encrypt, 
negate, add and multiply). 
The following parameters were used: 
Parameter Value 
poly_modulus 1x^2048 + 1 
coeff_modulus An 128-bit integer modulus with a degree of 
2048. 
plain_modulus 1 << 8 
noise_standard_deviation Standard value (3,19). 
Table 4.8 - SEAL integer encoding's parameters 
Three attempts were performed to reach the following performance data: 
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Step 1st attempt 2nd attempt 3rd attempt Average 
Key generation 6.878 milliseconds 7,395 milliseconds 7,536 milliseconds 7,269 
milliseconds 
Encoding of 5 0,077 milliseconds 0,009 milliseconds 0,029 milliseconds 0,038 
milliseconds 
Encoding of -7 0,470 milliseconds 0,678 milliseconds 0,489 milliseconds 0,546 
milliseconds 
Encryption of 
5 
10,883 milliseconds 10,785 milliseconds 14,696 milliseconds 12,121 
milliseconds 
Encryption of -
7 
21,130 milliseconds 21,504 milliseconds 32,153 milliseconds 24,929 
milliseconds 
Negate of 5 0,034 milliseconds 0,052 milliseconds 0,039 milliseconds 0,042 
milliseconds 
Sum of -5 and -
7 
0,061 milliseconds 0,057 milliseconds 0,081 milliseconds 0,066 
milliseconds 
Multiplication 
of -12 with -7 
114,053 
milliseconds 
106,404 
milliseconds 
132,802 
milliseconds 
117,753 
milliseconds 
Decryption of 
the result 
11,445 milliseconds 10,422 milliseconds 11,026 milliseconds 10,964 
milliseconds 
Table 4.9 - SEAL's data protection metrics 
In all of the attempts, the noise started at 35 bits being only changed to 17 bits on the multiplication step. 
ii. String 
Similarly to what was done on Paillier, the following logic was implemented to simulate string 
concatenations, with a twist: 
1. Both strings s1 and s2 are converted to Unicode; 
2. Both unicodes U(s1) and U(s2) are encrypted using the Encryptor object from the SEAL library; 
3. The encrypted unicodes E(U(s1)) and E(U(s2)) are concatenated with a secret split character 
between them. 
 For decryptions: 
1. The encrypted data E(U(s1)) ⊕ E(U(s2)) is split by the secret split character that was previously 
defined, originating two different encrypted strings E(U(s1)) and E(U(s2)). 
2. Both encrypted strings are decrypted using the Decryptor object from the SEAL library, thus 
originating the original Unicode values U(s1) and U(s2) 
3. The Unicode values are concatenated back originating U(s1⊕ s2) 
4. The Unicode value U(s1⊕ s2) is converted back to String originating s1⊕ s2. 
The twist being that in C++ it’s not possible to encode integers that are bigger than 2147483647, which 
makes it impossible to use UTF-8 Unicode for Strings. For example, a small string like “Andre” is 
065110100114101 in Unicode, which is already a lot bigger than the limit. In order to go around this 
issue, every time a string surpasses the maximum value of integers the following logic is executed: 
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1. The string is split into 2 or more strings (depending on size) 
2. The resulting strings are encrypted separately; 
3. The encrypted string are concatenated with the same split character as in the actual encryption 
operations. 
The same strings that were used before on Paillier were here tested as well, for a direct comparison. 
String 1 String 2 Encryption time 
(string 1) 
Encryption time 
(string 2) 
“Andre “ “Lourenco” 22,098 ms 34,479 ms 
“Cristiano “ “Ronaldo” 38,188 ms 35,497 ms 
“AaBbCcDdEeFfGgHh” “IiJjKkLlMmNnOoPp” 78,132 ms 74,151 ms 
“qwertyQWERTYqwerty” “QWERTYqwerty 
QWERTYqwerty” 
74,407 ms 99,747 ms 
“Hello “ “World” 21,785 ms 21,456 ms 
“221B Baker Street“ “, London, England” 67,443 ms 65,743 ms 
“abdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
” 
“ABCDEFGHIJKLMN
OP QRSTUVWXYZ” 
110,416 ms 120,451 ms 
Table 4.10 - SEAL's string concatenation adaptation execution times 
d. Access control 
Just like on Paillier, a Role-Based Access Control policy was applied to the decryption command that 
was implemented on Splunk. The command was configured to be readable by the admin user role only. 
The admin role here is equivalent to the “Administrator” role that was introduced on the Internal users 
of section 3.1.1. 
The decryption was already shown on the previous section. Nevertheless, if a user outside the admin 
role were to try to use this command, Splunk acts as if the command doesn’t exist at all, like shown on 
Figure 4.20. 
 
Figure 4.20 - SEAL's access control 
e. Prototype analysis 
This prototype is here analysed regarding performance, security, usability and complexity. 
Just as on the Paillier prototype, the “External Processor approach was tested on this prototype, for the 
same reasons. 
i. Performance 
As was already shown on the Data Protection section, this prototype shows a massive improvement on 
the performance side when comparing with Paillier. 
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Table 4.11 proves the above statement with the following information: 
• Both encryption start and end timestamps were sent to the Splunk indexer along with the already 
protected data. 
• 3 tests were performed: 
o Test 1 – 1000 customer orders 
o Test 2 – 5000 customer orders 
o Test 3 – 10000 customer orders 
Test 
# 
Number of 
customer order 
(distinct global 
ids) 
Number of 
events 
Bytes Total 
encryption 
time (secs) 
Avg. time 
per event 
(secs) 
Avg. 
time per 
MB 
(secs) 
1 1000 10024 5 648 997 3 615,37 0,361 0,64 
2 5000 50269 28 369 243 18 156,38 0,361 0,64 
3 10000 100959 56 991 136 37 574,12 0.372 0.66 
Table 4.11 - SEAL's performance metrics 
As is shown on Table 4.11, this prototype offers a substantial improvement on the Performance metrics 
that were calculated for Paillier, while losing approximately one decimal value in comparison with the 
AES prototype. All things considered, SEAL encrypts all personal data of a single event in 
approximately 0,365 seconds and encrypts 1 MB in approximately 0,64 secs. 
Taking into account the personal data estimate of 1% that was established on section 3.1.4 and 
considering that approximately 24GBs of data (~50 million events) are received every day, the OI 
application is expected to receive 240MBs of personal data per day. 
In conclusion, 153,6 seconds or 2,56 minutes would be needed to encrypt all personal data of a single 
day, which is still very acceptable.  
ii. Security 
This solution can be applied on scenario 2 with combined encryption and anonymization, scenario 3 
with pure encryption for specific data and scenario 5 with pure encryption for all data. 
This solution is pretty good security wise, in the sense that the protected data (or portion of data) cannot 
be interpreted by the human eye without being decrypted, just like any normal encryption scenario. 
iii. Usability 
Even though the data is pseudonymized, it can still be processed for certain operations. Similary to 
Paillier, the amount of work that can be done on the data without jeopardizing its integrity is quite 
limited. Even though the deck of numeric operations is much more vast here (aside from add and 
multiply there is also negate, square, exponentiate, apply galois and many others), string manipulation 
is still limited to concatenations.  
Table 4.12 illustrates the aforementioned facts. 
Type of data SEAL usage 
Name Can only be concatenated with other strings using the concatenation 
adaptation algorithm. 
Age All mathematic operations that are available on SEAL (egs.: Add, Subtract, 
Multiply, Divide, Negate, Power…) can be performed on this field. 
Address This field has both numeric values and strings.  
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All the strings like the name of the street or the locality can only be 
concatenated with other strings using the concatenation adapatation 
algorithm. 
The numeric values like the street number can be processed with all the 
mathematic operations that are available on SEAL (egs.: Add, Subtract, 
Multiply, Divide, Negate, Power…). 
Gender Can only be concatenated with other strings using the concatenation 
adaptation algorithm. 
Identification Number All mathematic operations that are available on SEAL (egs.: Add,  Subtract, 
Multiply, Divide, Negate, Power…) can be performed on this field. 
Email Can only be concatenated with other strings using the concatenation 
adaptation algorithm. 
Phone Number Even though this field is mostly numeric, it may have a prefix which is a 
string (eg.: “+351”). In case it hasn’t, the prefix can be added with the 
concatenation adaptation algorithm. 
The remaining numeric value can be processed with all the mathematic 
operations that are available on SEAL (egs.: Add, Subtract, Multiply, 
Divide, Negate, Power…). 
Birthdate In case the birthdate is incomplete (eg.: doesn’t have the year), it can be 
fixed with the concatenation adaptation algorithm. 
All the numeric values (day, month and year) can be processed with all the 
mathematic operations that are available on SEAL (egs.: Add, Subtract, 
Multiply, Divide, Negate, Power…). 
Table 4.12 - SEAL usage by data type 
In conclusion, the solution is a bit better than paillier and normal encryption in its usability, but not 
much. 
iv. Complexity 
The complexity of this solution is quite high in terms of client deploys. Since only a very limited set of 
operations can be performed on the data after encryption, a clear decision must be made as to which 
data can be protected with this method, i.e. which data will only need that set of operations and nothing 
more. Table 4.7 from the Usability analysis chapter already shows what kind of work can be performed 
for each type of data. 
This solution also involves setting up a separate server that works as an external processor, which might 
not be attractive to a client.  
The external processor protects the data, but that same data is only processed on the Splunk side, 
meaning that new Splunk commands need to be implemented to concatenate strings and perform 
mathematical operations at search time.  
Finally, if needed, a command will also be needed to decrypt the data for users with higher privileges, 
in which case public keys will need to be shared between all the involved servers. Maintaining public 
and private keys on clustered environments exponentiates the complexity of the solution even more. 
f. GDPR analysis 
Just like Paillier, this prototype complies with everything that is stated in GDPR. All personal data is 
protected with the use of encryption - like said on GDPR’s article 25 (General Data Protection 
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Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, n.d.), “Data protection by default and by design”, of section 
2.1.4 - before it is stored on the indexer machine.  
Also, the integrity of the data is maintained - like said on GDPR’s article 5 (General Data Protection 
Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, n.d.), “Processing of personal data”, shown on section 2.1.2 - 
since a user with enough privileges can still use a decryption command to see data in its original form. 
The only kind of data processing that can be done is to concatenate strings at search time and mathematic 
operations, which still doesn’t affect the actual data that is stored on the indexer anyway. 
g. Prototype conclusion 
Being a homomorphic encryption based prototype, SEAL is fully complaint with GDPR and at the same 
time allows some computation to be performed on the data without jeopardizing its security and 
integrity.  
As predicted on the prototype conclusion of Paillier (see section 4.2.3) SEAL offers a huge improvement 
in terms of performance and the amount of computation/data processing it allows to be done is a lot 
bigger for numeric data, where it shines above all encryption schemes by offering a wide set of 
operations that can be performed without jeopardizing the security of the data. 
Nevertheless, SEAL has exactly the same capabilities as Paillier for alpha-numeric data processing. 
Concatenation of strings is also possible with AES and with better performance, like shown on the 
performance analysis of section 4.2.2, thus making the use of homomorphic encryption on strings 
unjustifiable until a better solution comes up.  
Section 4.3 proposes 2 different solutions that use both the SEAL and AES prototypes in order to use 
the best out of the two worlds while using different architectures to satisfy different client scenarios. 
4.3 Proposed solutions 
Two scenarios were here considered while proposing the solution: 
1. Client has enough resources and installing an additional server is not a problem. 
2. Client doesn’t have enough resources but is ok with having strict access control policies 
enforced onto all users of the platform. 
It is also considered that it is not possible to have the best of both worlds, meaning that the client 
cannot ask for the best security with more open access control while having few resources, and vice-
versa. 
4.3.1 Solution 1 – External Processor based protection 
This solution uses an External Processor to protect all personal data before it reaches the indexer and is 
to be used on the first scenario, where the client imposes no restrictions on the resources. This external 
processor will be executing one of two possible algorithms depending on the data format: 
• If the data is in a numeric format, it is encrypted with the SEAL library. This library was already 
showed in use on section 4.2.4; 
• If the data is in an alpha-numeric format, it is encrypted with the AES algorithm. This algorithm 
was already showed in use on section 4.2.2.  
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Once the data reaches the indexer machine, it is already protected and ready to be seen and processed 
by all users on the search head. For that effect, the following commands will need to be implemented 
on the Search Head: 
• “decryptseal” – This command was already shown in use on the “Data Protection” section of 
the SEAL prototype (see section 4.2.4). Only its numeric variant will be used. It should be used 
only by administrators and should generate a log warning saying that the user “X” decrypted 
personal information of the event “Y”. For this matter, the command should receive an 
additional parameter named “justification” where the user can put the reason of the decryption. 
• “sealsum”, “sealmultiply”, “sealnegate”, … - These commands were already showed in use on 
the “Data Protection” section of the SEAL prototype (see section 4.2.4). One command might 
be implemented per each operation that is provided by the SEAL library. They can be used by 
any user of the application. 
• “decryptaes” – This command was already showed in use on the “Data Protection” section of 
the AES prototype (see section 4.2.2). It should be used only by administrators and should 
generate a log warning saying that the user “X” decrypted personal information of the event 
“Y”. For this matter, the command should receive an additional parameter named “justification” 
where the user can put the reason of the decryption. 
Once these commands are implemented, all users can perform the normal operations of an operational 
intelligence solution on the data.  
Only the administrators will be able to decrypt the data. Even though it is not part of the scope of this 
project, the data decryption action should be stored on a local log file, so that it can later on be consulted. 
This is required by GDPR on article 30 “Records of processing activities” (General Data Protection 
Regulation - Final text neatly arranged, n.d.). As said on the mentioned article, the following information 
should be on the log file: 
• Name and contact details of the controller; 
• Purposes of the processing; 
• Description of the categories of data subjects and their personal data; 
• Categories of recipients to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed, if applicable; 
• Envisaged time limits for erasure, if possible and applicable; 
• General description of the technical and organisational security measures. 
It is strongly suggested that an email is also triggered with the justification for project responsible 
personnel. 
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4.3.2 Solution 2 – Search time protection 
This solution encrypts the data on the search head server and is to be used on the second scenario, where 
the client has restrictions on quantity of resources but is ok with a more strict access control. Just like 
on the “External processor based protection” solution, two algorithms can be executed based on the time 
format: 
• If the data is in a numeric format, it is encrypted with the SEAL library. This library was already 
showed in use on section 4.2.4; 
• If the data is in an alpha-numeric format, it is encrypted with the AES algorithm. This algorithm 
was already showed in use on section 4.2.2. 
In this case, the data reaches the indexer still in an unprotected format, meaning that it is still not ready 
to be shown on the search head. Thus, it needs an additional command to encrypt the data. The 
commands are as follows: 
• “encryptseal” – This command was already shown in use on the “Data Protection” section of 
the SEAL prototype. Only its numeric variant will be used. It can be used by any user of the 
application. 
• “decryptseal” – This command was already shown in use on the “Data Protection” section of 
the SEAL prototype (see section 4.2.4). Only its numeric variant will be used. It should be used 
only by administrators and should generate a log warning saying that the user “X” decrypted 
personal information of the event “Y”. For this matter, the command should receive an 
additional parameter named “justification” where the user can put the reason of the decryption. 
• “sealsum”, “sealmultiply”, “sealnegate”, … - These commands were already showed in use on 
the “Data Protection” section of the SEAL prototype (see section 4.2.4).. One command might 
be implemented per each operation that is provided by the SEAL library. They can be used by 
any user of the application. 
• “encryptaes” - This command was already showed in use on the “Data Protection” section of 
the AES prototype (see section 4.2.2). It can be used by any user of the application. 
• “decryptaes” – This command was already showed in use on the “Data Protection” section of 
the AES prototype (see section 4.2.2). It should be used only by administrators and should 
generate a log warning saying that the user “X” decrypted personal information of the event 
“Y”. For this matter, the command should receive an additional parameter named “justification” 
where the user can put the reason of the decryption. 
Once these commands are implemented, all users can perform the normal operations of an operational 
intelligence solution on the data, having in mind that the encryption command should always be present 
on the beginning of each search. 
Just like on the first solution, all decryption commands have the access limited to administrator users 
only and the execution of these commands should originate an entry on a log file to register o decrypted 
which event and why. 
Still, since the data is kept unprotected on the indexer, the access to that server should be limited as 
follows: 
• Can access the server: System Administrators and Administrators; 
• Cannot access the server: Developers. 
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In order to centralize the access control of users to servers and to applications, it is recommended that 
an LDAP server is used to ease up the process. If the client doesn’t have an LDAP server set up, then 
normal operative system’s access control can be used for the server and the Splunk’s built-in access 
control can be used for the application. 
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4.4 Summary 
Four prototypes were suggested for the protection of operational intelligence data.  
The first prototype is based on anonymization of data. This is by far the easiest solution to implement 
and deploy and the best performance wise. It is on its usability and GDPR compliance that it lacks the 
most. Once the data is anonymized it can no longer be used and it cannot be reverted back to its original 
state, making it impossible to be interpreted by operational intelligence solutions. Also, anonymizing 
data is the same as destroying data which, according to GDPR, goes against integrity requirements 
unless the affected individual applies his right to be forgotten (General Data Protection Regulation - 
Final text neatly arranged, n.d.). This solution should then be only used on those situations. 
The second prototype makes use of the AES encryption scheme while limiting the access of users to the 
operations that decrypt the data based on their role. This prototype is easier to implement and deploy as 
part of a product because it doesn’t require an additional server to be installed just for the data protection. 
Also, it offers even better performance than SEAL, making it much more desirable for scenarios with a 
lot of alpha-numeric data being processed. Its biggest downfall is that it lacks usability in the sense that 
the only operation that can be done on the protected data is to concatenate it with other data. 
Finally, the last two prototypes make use of homomorphic encryption algorithms and showcase their 
capabilities in processing data that is already encrypted. Paillier is the weaker algorithm, allowing only 
add and multiply operations on numeric data and concatenations on alpha-numeric data. It was also 
proven that its performance is unacceptable for big data standards. 
SEAL on the other hand is much more robust in terms of numeric data processing offering a much wider 
set of numeric operations to be performed. It also shows a big improvement in performance where it 
really shines with an average of approximately 0,002 seconds of encryption time per event. Still, it only 
offers the concatenation operation for alpha-numeric operations, where it is not justified to use it instead 
of normal and more common encryption schemes like AES.  
Based on all the above prototypes, two final solution proposals were made using both homomorphic and 
symmetric encryption. These two proposals satisfy different client scenarios by offering different 
architectures.  
The first proposed solution is based on the external processor approach and is well suited for clients 
with a good amount of resources where installing a new server is not a problem. It offers better 
compliance with GDPR due to the fact that the data is already stored in an encrypted format 
The second proposed solution is based on protecting personal data at search time and suits better 
companies that have fewer resources but are ok with applying more strict access control techniques. 
Protecting data at search time means that the data is stored in cleartext and is only protected as it is read, 
thus offering weaker GDPR compliance. This is where the strict access control techniques come into 
the picture by offering a way of limiting the access to the data in cleartext. 
Section 5 builds a conclusion for this thesis’ report.  
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5 Conclusion 
The arrival of GDPR and the lack of operational intelligence solutions that are compliant with it is seen 
as an opportunity to develop something that shines in the market. Also, the increasing popularity of 
homomorphic encryption is a good indicator that this should be the way to go when it comes to 
protecting data that still needs to be processed afterwards.  
This thesis contributes to a real operational intelligence solution scenario implemented with Splunk, a 
product that provides means of searching, monitoring and analysing machine big data but is yet to have 
an adequate solution to protect personal data that is yet to come. For this matter, a set of performance, 
security, usability and complexity requirements was created and 4 different prototypes that use both 
Splunk external and internal libraries were considered.  
The main objective of the thesis was to come up with an efficient method of protecting data while 
maintaining it usable by operational intelligence standards. This was partially achieved with 
homomorphic encryption where, for numeric data, the performance of the SEAL library was 
considerable. Nevertheless, it was also proven that there is still no efficient method to apply 
homomorphic encryption onto alpha-numeric data, making it mandatory to use the more common 
encryption methods like symmetric encryption with AES. 
Finally, two well composed solutions were suggested for the problem.  
The first solution uses an external processor that protects personal data before it reaches the Splunk 
environment. It proved to be efficient in terms of security and fully compliant with GDPR, while it 
lacked in the usability and complexity requirements due to requiring an additional server that is not 
attractive to clients.  
The second solution only protects personal data at search time, meaning that it is stored on the indexer 
in a cleartext format. This is not compliant with GDPR unless there is a strict access control in the server 
that stores the data, which is a lot harder to achieve. 
While the perfect solution would be somewhere between the two solutions, where the data is protected 
with a mixture of homomorphic and symmetric encryption algorithms at search time, such an approach 
is not possible with current state of the art in Splunk, meaning that there’s always going to be a 
compromise either in security or in usability. 
In conclusion, the appropriate solution will always depend on the scenario at hand. If the client has less 
resources, one should choose the search time solution and enforce strict security and access control 
policies. If the client has more resources, one should choose the external processor solution which is 
compliant with all security and GDPR requirements. 
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Annex A – Regular expressions 
The following regular expressions were used throughout this project to identify personal data. 
Phone number: 
((\+351|00351) (91|92|93|96)\d{7})|((\+33|0033) (01|02|03|04|05)\d{8})|((\+44|0033) 
(((01|02|03|05|07|08|09)\d{9})|(011\d{8})|(0800\d{7})|((013873|015242|015394|015395|015396|01697
3|016974|016977|017683|017684|017687|019467)\d{5}))) 
Company name: 
^[a-zA-Z\u00C0-\u017F´\-\(\)]+(([',. -][a-zA-Z\u00C0-\u017F´\-\(\) ])?[a-zA-Z\u00C0-\u017F´\-
\(\)]*)*$ 
First name 
^[a-zA-Z\u00C0-\u017F´]+(([',. -][a-zA-Z\u00C0-\u017F´ ])?[a-zA-Z\u00C0-\u017F´]*)*$ 
Last name 
^[a-zA-Z\u00C0-\u017F´]+(([',. -][a-zA-Z\u00C0-\u017F´ ])?[a-zA-Z\u00C0-\u017F´]*)*$ 
Address 
.+?(?=,), ([0-9]+), (-2|-
1|RC|0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9|10|11|12)(Esq|Dir|Esquerdo|Direito|L|R|Left|Right|A|B|C|D|E|F), 
(\d\d\d\d\d|\d\d\d\d-\d\d\d|[A-Z][A-Z]\d\d \d[A-Z][A-Z]) - .+?(?=,), .+?(?=,), (PT|UK|FR) 
Identification number 
\d{9} 
Email 
.+?(?=@)@.+?(?=\.).(pt|com|iol\.pt) 
Birthdate 
([12]\d{3}-(0[1-9]|1[0-2])-(0[1-9]|[12]\d|3[01])) 
Gender 
MALE|FEMALE 
 
